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Abstract
This research seeks to achieve two objectives: 1) to provide a comprehensive survey of
research related to defense contractor profitability, and 2) to conduct an updated analysis of
such profitability. No previous comprehensive survey of the topic was found in the academic
literature. Therefore, the provision of such a survey may significantly benefit future researchers.
A paucity of recent defense contractor profit research related was identified; only one published
study analyzed data after 2000 and none used data more recent than 2010. This research
reconciles the gap in recent defense contractor profit studies via objective two.
Panel data analysis is employed to examine the profitability of defense contractors
between 2009 and 2018. The relationship between contractor influence in the defense
marketplace and profits from defense business is explored as well as the relationship between
contractor operating risk and defense business profits. Additionally, the relationship between
defense contractor profitability and the percentage of total sales attributed to defense (versus
commercial sales) is investigated. Neither contractor influence, nor risk was found to have a
moderating effect on defense business profits. The empirical evidence did however indicate a
positive relationship between contractor profitability and the percentage of total sales from
defense business.
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DEFENSE CONTRACTOR PROFIT
I. Introduction
Background
Alexander Hamilton, then Secretary of the Treasury, noted in his 1791 Report on the
Subject of Manufactures that a provision for annual purchases of military weapons from
domestic suppliers would economically benefit such manufacturers while bolstering national
defense (Hamilton, 1791). Two hundred years later the United States still benefit from a
collection of domestic defense suppliers that has evolved to what is now referred to as the
defense industrial base. This base provides national security through its ability to rapidly
innovate and deliver the enhanced military lethality and technological dominance necessary to
deter and prevail during conflict (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). Originally, from the 1790s
to 1941, civilian firms were leveraged to meet military manufacturing and supply needs only
during periods of conflict when such needs exceeded the capacity of government owned
arsenals and shipyards (Lynn, 2014). The incredible scale of the Second World War however,
with its profusion of emergent warfighting technologies, ushered in the era of a standing
defense industry via President Roosevelt’s War Production Board in 1942. The War Production
Board officially coordinated the conscription of major U.S. civilian industries, such as automobile
production, into domestic wartime service (Lynn, 2014). When World War II concluded the
industrial players conscripted into wartime service did not quietly return to strictly civilian
enterprises as was standard for the terminus of previous United States conflicts. Instead, many
corporations retained divisions solely committed to defense contracting (Lynn, 2014). Over the
following decades these defense focused divisions grew and evolved while continuing to meet
the United States’ military needs--ultimately attracting numerous new entrants into the
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burgeoning defense industry. Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III notes
that defense contractors in today’s age meet not only vital military requirements but also
deliver technologies that greatly enrich the daily lives of civilians with developments like GPS
and the internet (Lynn, 2014).
Publicly traded corporations engaged in defense contracting, like corporations with a
purely commercial focus, must generate sufficient shareholder value in order to sustain
continued operations. Consequently, the depth, breadth, and continued existence of United
States defense contractors -- the core of our nation’s defense industrial base -- is inextricably
linked to their profitability. Defense contractor profitability therefore yields associated
implications to national security, technological advancement and innovation, and both taxpayer
and shareholder value. Given these implications, it is unsurprising that defense contractor
profits have garnered abiding attention from elected representatives, government officials, and
academics since the inception of the defense industry following World War II.
Research Objectives and Questions
This research effort seeks to achieve two objectives: (1) to provide a comprehensive
survey of the extant research literature examining the topic of defense contractor profitability,
and (2) to conduct a recently updated analysis of such profitability, inspired by the
aforementioned survey. No previous comprehensive survey of the topic appears to be found in
the academic literature. Therefore, the provision of such a survey herein may be a considerable
contribution to subsequent researchers in the field. Also, this survey identified a paucity of
recent research in the field of defense contractor profits and seeks to reconcile this via objective
two.
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Motivated by the survey of literature, this research is focused on addressing three
questions. First, how might a defense contractor’s level of market influence correlate to the
profitability of their defense business? Second, how might a defense contractor’s operating risk
relate to the profitability of their defense business? Finally, what is the relationship between
defense contractor profitability and the percentage of total sales attributed specifically to
defense (versus commercial sales)?
Limitations and Scope of Research
Objective one--the research survey--is relatively unconstrained. It is limited to
unclassified and publicly available research germane to the profitability of defense contractors
published (or otherwise made available) at the time the survey was conducted. The scope of the
literature survey consists almost entirely of peer-reviewed and published academic research
articles, and United States government or government-sponsored studies; however, several
books of exceptional merit--owing to the expert authority of the author--have been included.
Objective two--the recently updated analysis of defense contractor profitability--was
constrained in several ways. First, the data for analysis was strictly limited to that which was
unclassified and publicly available. This research did not have access to any private corporate
data. Only such figures mandated for discloser by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
or voluntarily provided in annual corporate filings to the SEC were analyzed. Second, corporate
data collected from the SEC’s website and Yahoo! Finance was assumed accurate. Similarly,
annual government contracting figures reported by the Federal Procurement Data System were
also assumed to be accurate. Additionally, data availability was limited to that from publicly
traded, domestic corporations actively operating at the time of the study. Data for analysis was
not available from defunct, private, not-for-profit, or previously acquired organizations or firms.
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The limitations faced by objective two of this research serve to define its scope. Specifically, the
analysis of defense contractor profitability targets publicly traded United States defense
contractors listed in the annual Top 100 Contractors Report published by the Federal
Procurement Data System between 2009 and 2018.
Thesis Overview
This thesis consists of five chapters. A survey of defense contractor profit literature is
provided in Chapter 2. First, a review of the linkage between defense contractor profits and (1)
national security, (2) innovation and technological supremacy, and (3) taxpayer and shareholder
value is presented. Next, a discussion of the challenges related to assessing contractor profit and
comparing various profit study outcomes is offered. The remainder of Chapter 2 is dedicated to
a detailed survey of defense contractor profit research prior to 2019. Chapter 3 introduces the
methodology employed for conducting a current analysis of defense contractor profitability
between 2009 and 2018. Next, the hypotheses used to explore the research questions are
developed and how they are tested is explained. The components of the model used, including
the period of study and variables employed are described. Also, justification for each of the
model component’s specification is provided. Lastly, the data and methodology used to analyze
the data are discussed. Chapter 4 details the results of the analysis described in Chapter 3 and
answers the research questions. Chapter 5 provides the conclusions of this research and
suggests potential follow-on research.
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II. Survey of Literature
Chapter Overview
Before approaching a detailed survey of defense contractor profit research, it is
important to possess an understanding of why one should care about the profits earned by
defense contractors and the challenges related to previous studies of the topic. This chapter first
outlines the implications of defense contractor profit on: 1) national security; 2) innovation and
technological supremacy; and 3) taxpayer and shareholder value. Next, the challenges of
assessing defense contractor profits are discussed. This section describes the different ways that
defense contractor profit has been measured and how “defense contractor” has been defined
and used in research. Then, the challenges of comparing profits due to differing market
structures and risk are explored. Finally, a survey of defense contractor profitability research is
provided. This survey is separated into three sections: 1) studies which examine profitability
from the firm level; 2) those that study profitability from the business segment level; and 3)
studies which have been sponsored by the government.
The Importance of Defense Contractor Profit
By examining defense contractor profit one can gain insight into the financial health of
individual firms and the defense industry at large. These profits may also serve as a way to
gauge the effects of changes in Federal defense acquisition regulations, procedures, and
priorities. Given the enormity of the United States’ annual defense procurement budgets, which
averaged 3.18% of the total annual national budget between 2009 and 2018 (Office of
Management and Budget; 2020), it is important that our acquisitions process works as intended.
Procurement process impacts aside, defense contractor profit is an important
consideration because it sustains the continued operations of firms serving the defense
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industrial base. Since these firms are no longer conscripted into meeting the nation’s defense
needs, profits attainable in the defense industry must be sufficient to attract and retain
domestic businesses to supply defense goods and services. Ideally, the profit opportunities
afforded by the defense industry would fall within a type of “goldilocks zone”. Perceived
excessive profits are unpalatable to taxpayers who bear the price of such profits--which are seen
as poor stewardship of government budgetary resources. Conversly, taxpayers suffer a Cadmean
victory if profits in the defense industry become so miniscule as to produce a market of last
resort. Ultimately, the depth and breadth of the United States defense industrial base is
inextricably linked to the profitability of contractors serving therein. Defense contractor
profitability is an important area of study because of the associated implications to national
security, technological advancement and innovation, and both taxpayer and shareholder value.
National Security
Civilian firms provide viable productive capacities which are important to defense in two
ways: 1) they fortify the supply chain by maintaining arsenals and outfitting the military services
on a daily basis; and 2) they deliver production surge capabilities during periods of conflict.
During World War II President Franklin D. Roosevelt referred to the U.S. domestic defense
manufacturing capability--i.e., the defense industrial base--as the “arsenal of democracy”
(Roosevelt, 1940). Today, civilian firms continue their tradition of making vital contributions to
our nation’s security. The defense industrial base is explicitly noted as foundational to U.S.
national defense in Executive Order No. 12,919 (1994). In light of the central role defense
contractors play in national defense, their profitability is an important consideration; it
contributes to the financial well-being and thus longevity of the firm.
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Innovation and Technological Supremacy
Porter’s Five Forces Framework for analyzing competition in industry explains that a
profitable industry incites market entry by new firms (Porter, 1979). Further, the entrance of
new firms increases industry competition and--as noted by then Under Secretary of Defense
Ashton B. Carter--these new entrants “renew and refresh the technology base, and ensure that
defense is benefitting from the main currents of emerging technology” (Carter, 2011).
Therefore, the profitability of defense contractors is an important element in fostering
innovation. In fact, economic profits have been cited as an optimal way to motivate innovation
among defense contractors (Rogerson, 1989). Such innovation has delivered pioneering
advancements like stealth technology, night-vision goggles, and unmanned aircraft--which give
our troops a distinct battlefield advantage. Other innovations born of the defense industry--such
as Duct Tape, walkie-talkies, GPS navigation, and the internet--have also permeated and
improved the daily lives of civilians.
Taxpayer and Shareholder Value
When considering defense contractor profitability, it may first appear that taxpayer and
corporate shareholder interests are diametrically opposed. However, there are instances when
that is not true. Given the Defense Department’s reliance on the industrial base to buttress
national security, taxpayer and corporate shareholder interests are aligned in many ways when
promoting a vibrant and financially stable defense industry. A highly productive defense base
that is both cost-efficient and cost-effective is most likely to function as part of a profitable
business environment. This profitable environment benefits corporate investors and taxpayers
alike; the former viewing profits as an end goal and the latter viewing profitability as a means to
secure national defense. Taxpayers also benefit from the fact that the domestic defense
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industry is a major employer. The defense industry afforded 2.3 million jobs for Americans in
2000 (Else, 2000) and accounted for roughly 1.3% of total private sector employment in 2018
through the provision of 1.6 million jobs (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). Taxpayer interests
are aligned with some level of defense contractor profitability given that profits keep defense
contractors in business; and they in turn provide not only defense goods and services but
numerous jobs to the American public. Taxpayers are loath however, to feel they may be unduly
subsidizing the defense base. This sentiment is rather vividly expressed by Adams and Adams
who repine that “defense contractors seem to be safely sheltered in the womb of government
with their umbilical cord tied to the U.S. Treasury” (Adams & Adams, 1972). Defense
procurement scandals involving $600 ashtrays and $800 toilet seats (Greer & Liao, 1986) offer
further evidence of taxpayer sensitivity to contractor profit. This profit sensitivity may be further
exacerbated given that voters at large significantly overestimate the actual levels of national
defense outlays (Jones, 1999). David Kaun notes that defense contractors themselves are also
sensitive to the perception of excessive profitability -- or the “cardinal sin of a monopolist”
(Alchian & Kessel, 1962) -- as such a perception would “raise congressional and public ire, and
may call for increased regulation” (Kaun, 1988). In fact, Scherer (1964) cites that executives of
defense contracting firms had commented that is was unwise to earn and retain profits above
10% on any single incentive contract and had even choose to voluntarily refund--with some
regularity--any profits above that level although under no legal requirement to do so. Scherer
further references the General Accounting Office’s proclivity to audit in detail contracts which
generated profits to defense contractors above 12% and states that Congress’ unfailing reaction
had been to suspect profiteering (1964). The delicate balance of taxpayers’ -- and to some
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extent, defense contractors’-- somewhat conflicted interests surrounding defense contractor
profitability adds yet another angle of analysis to this multifaceted issue.
Challenges in Assessing Defense Contractor “Profit”
Measuring Profit
Assessing the profitability of defense contractors is a particular challenge given the
numerous ways in which “profit” can be specifically defined, interpreted, and operationalized
for research. Primarily, differences in profitability assessments appear to stem from the use of
either accounting or market-value based measures. Accounting measures of profitability have
been popularly justified on the grounds that information provided by balance sheets and income
statements is simply the best data available (Hirschey & Wichern, 1984). Many proponents of
accounting-based profit measures concede that such methods are not perfect though. For
example, the usefulness of comparisons based on such information may be dulled due to
differences in accounting practices between firms or industries (Bowlin, 1995). Greer & Liao
specifically note that the allocation of corporate overhead and other costs between divisions
and across contracts may distort the profit attributed to any specific division (1986). Thus,
accounting practices may allow for the arbitrary redistribution of profits among various
segments within the firm. Other academics have confirmed defense contractors’ opportunity for
cost shifting via accounting practices (Lichtenberg, 1992; Rogerson, 1992; Thomas & Tung,
1992). Ultimately, Greer and Liao conclude that investigations into a firm’s defense business
profits should simultaneously consider their commercial profits (1986). After completing a firmlevel profit study, Bowlin also remarks that comparisons distinguishing between the defense and
commercial business segments would be informative (1995). Fisher and McGowan remonstrate
the use of accounting measures entirely by suggesting that firm-level data makes inferences
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about relative profit rates impossible -- thus completely devaluing the use of accounting profit
data (1983). If accepted, Fisher and McGowan’s argument would render an analysis of defense
industry profits intractable. However, their stance regarding the use of accounting profit has
generated much dissent. Long and Ravenscraft rebutted that Fisher and McGowan “ignore
substantial evidence that accounting profits do, on average, yield important insights into
economic performance” (1984). Ira Horwitz noted in a moderate response that the
shortcomings of accounting-based profit measures should not disqualify their use entirely; but
rather that such analysis should be undertaken thoughtfully with a keen awareness of those
shortcomings (Horowitz, 1984).
While the use of accounting measures of profitability has been widespread
(Weidenbaum, 1968; Agapos & Gallaway, 1970; Carroll, 1972), other academics have
championed the use of market-value data (Stigler & Friedland, 1971; Canes & Watts, 1976;
Hirschey & Wichern, 1984). Such advocates conclude that market-value data provide unique and
valuable perspectives regarding firm profitability. Still others conclude that both accounting and
market measures should be used to assess profitability (Ross, 1983; Myers, Peterson, McClenon,
Konvalinka, & Wood, 1985; Mayer-Sommer & Bedingfield, 1989). Stephen Ross notes that
market-value data communicates profit information from an expectational perspective while
accounting data provides an alternate view of the same firm from a historical perspective
(1983). He argues that by comparing accounting and market-value data we gain a more
complete understanding of a firm’s profitability. Hirschey and Wichern similarly accept that
using both accounting and market data (although both are individually imperfect) produces
unique and highly beneficial (although still imperfect) measures of profitability (1984).
Ultimately, the profusion of defense contractor profitability studies employing accounting
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measures, market-value measures, or both indicates a willingness among researchers to accept
such data imperfections.
Defining “Defense Contractor”
The challenges of defining and measuring profit notwithstanding, assessments of
profitability are especially labored given the heterogeneity of firms that may rightly claim the
title “defense contractor”. According to the Code of Federal Regulations a defense contractor is
“any individual, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal non-Federal entity
that enters into a contract directly with the DoD to furnish services, supplies, or construction”
(Operational Contract Support, 2012). Firms that meet the preceding definition vary widely
along several dimensions. Defense contractors populate the spectrum from burgeoning small
business startups to mature conglomerates (Pownall, 1986). Some contract the provision of
goods -- others services. Goods contracted span diverse offerings from software to clothing to
armaments. Contracted services range from janitorial work to cloud computing and storage.
Some contractors generate 100% of their total revenues from government sales while others
operate a defense segment contributing to less than 1% of the firm’s revenues (Pownall, 1986).
Even within a single firm there may be multiple segments with varying degrees of defense
related business. McGowan and Vendrzyk consider three unique segment types within defense
contracting firms: 1) commercial segments (those with only commercial revenues); 2)
government segments (those with revenues predominantly from government business); and 3)
mixed segments -- those with revenues from both commercial and government business (2002).
The clear diversity of defense contracting firms, the business segments within those firms, and
the goods and services which they provide all contribute to a very broad definition of the title
“defense contractor”. Such a broad definition has supported a tremendous variety in the scope
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and treatment of sample firms utilized in defense contractor profit studies. Such studies have
therefore produced a full-spectrum assortment of results which have very often led to
contradictory conclusions among researchers.
Challenges in Comparing Assessed Profits
Academics have noted that the profits associated with defense contracting have been
perennially studied and passionately debated (Mayer-Sommer & Bedingfield, 1989). Besides the
lack of a consensus definition of defense contractor profit, a comparison of their profits is also
complicated by the diversity of both the market structures and risk under which they operate.
Therefore, scholarly comparisons of defense contractor profitability cannot be made without
adequate allowances for different market structures and risk (Jones, 1999). Defense market
structures populate the full economic spectrum from free competition to monopsonies and
oligopolies (Greer & Liao, 1986). However, many scholars note the preponderance of a
monopsony-oligopoly configuration in the defense industry whereby the government is typically
the only consumer of defense goods--or one of very few consumers--and suppliers are highly
concentrated (Adams & Adams, 1972; Gansler, 1980; Deutch, 2001; Dupre & Gustafson, 1962;
Gholz & Sapolsky, 2000; Greer & Liao, 1986; Marfels, 1978; Perry, 1979; Suarez, 1976;
Weidenbaum, 1968). In addition to market structure, the risk associated with defense business
is a key component of profit performance assessments (Bohi, 1973). However, Zhong and
Gribbin note that there is no direct measure available in prior research for quantifying risk
(2009). The lack of any direct measure of defense contractor risk has led to myriad risk
assessment methodologies among academics--which has produced a dissensus of findings.
Methods of assessing risk have ranged from correlating the variability of a company’s total sales
over time with the defense share of those total sales (Stigler & Friedland, 1971) to examining
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investment risk using of the Capital Asset Pricing Model’s “beta coefficient” (Bicksler & Hess,
1976; Higgs & Trevino, 1992). While some researchers have concluded that defense business is
riskier than non-defense business (Brown & Stothoff, 1976; Greer & Liao, 1986; Stigler &
Friedland, 1971; Weidenbaum, 1968), several of their peers have concluded the opposite
(Bicksler & Hess, 1976; Higgs & Trevino, 1992). Of course, market structure and risk are not the
only factors expected to influence defense profits. Kaun’s “Where Have all the Profits Gone?”
provides analysis which examines: economic conditions specific to the industry; differential
product demand within the industry; general economic conditions; general military
environment; and general political environment (1988). Given the impact both market structure
and risk have on defense contractor profitability it is important that they are not overlooked
when making any profitability assessments or comparisons.
Survey of Profitability Research
As previously mentioned, the profitability of U.S. defense contractors has been widely
examined. Both academic researchers and government sponsored studies have probed
contractor profitability employing myriad financial measures, samples, and a varying spectrum
of dates. One commonly recurring theme has been the use of the Top 100 Contractors Report
(Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation, 2018) as a basis for selecting a sample of
defense contractors to study. The Top 100 Contractors Report is produced annually by the U.S.
General Services Administration. It provides a rank-ordering of federal contractors by total
(unclassified) obligated dollar amount. This data is broken out by vendors specifically serving the
Department of Defense versus other government agencies like the Department of Homeland
Security or the Environmental Protection Agency and can be sorted by either the number of
contract actions or the total dollars obligated during the report period.
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As disparate have been the inputs into contractor profit studies and their conclusions,
so too have been the date ranges of data analyzed. Published studies have used data from as
early as 1942 (Agapos & Gallaway, 1970) and as recently as 2010 (Wang & San Miguel, 2012). A
relative deluge of studies focused on the 1960s through 1980s; this trend slowed to a trickle
incorporating data from the 1990s with only one published study incorporating data after the
year 2000.
Presenting a comprehensive review of the extant literature regarding defense
contractor profitability is complicated by the chronology of publish dates versus research
periods, the diverse methodologies employed, and the wide range of conclusions presented.
Many literature reviews of previous profit studies presented as part of newer research articles
throughout the decades have simply presented antecedents chronologically. This survey broadly
categorizes U.S. defense contractor profitability studies into one of three groups: 1) those which
primarily examine profitability at the firm level; 2) those which examine profitability in terms of
business segments within or between firms; and 3) studies conducted by or specifically
sponsored by the government (which may conduct either firm-level or segment-level analysis).
Such a taxonomic delivery of prior research provides the reader an intuitive analysis of the
methodologies and conclusions presented within each study. For example, an astute reader will
understand that the profit implications are fundamentally different if using firm-level data or if
using segment-level data; the use of firm-level data has been quite popularly employed but may
blur the distinction between defense and commercial business contributions to profit.
Conversely, segment-level accounting data may distinguish between defense and commercial
contributions to contractor profits. But, these conclusions may be clouded due to potential cost
shifting behavior within or between segments -- as alluded to by Admiral Hyman Rickover during
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his 1969 testimony before House of Representatives subcommittee on appropriations
(Department of Defense Appropriations for 1970, 1970) and researched by Rogerson (1992),
Thomas and Tung (1992), and Lichtenberg (1992). Additionally, the conclusions presented by
government sponsored research may be received with greater skepticism given the
interdependence of the government and defense industrial base. The following survey of U.S.
defense contractor profitability studies is delivered chronologically within the three broad
aforementioned categories.
Firm-Level Profitability
Firm-level data has been widely used to investigate defense contractor profitability
since the 1960s. The first of such studies to be popularly recognized is Murray Weidenbaum’s
1968 work titled “Arms and the American Economy: A Domestic Convergence Hypothesis.” The
study compares six large defense contractors to six commercial firms with similar sales volumes
over two four-year periods, 1952-1955 and 1962-1965. The study concludes that the defense
firms clearly exhibited lower profit margins on sales during both periods, but their capital
turnover rates (dollars of sales per dollar of net worth) were far greater than their commercial
peers during both periods (Weidenbaum, 1968). Ultimately, “the higher turnover rates for
defense companies more than offset the lower profit margins. Hence, their return on net worth
(net profits as a percent of stockholder’s investment) is considerably higher” (Weidenbaum
1968). Weidenbaum notes that the differences between the defense and commercial firms
widened between the periods of study. He also comments that although defense contractors
enjoyed greater relative profitability, investors reflected a less favorable evaluation compared to
commercial firms in terms of both price per earnings ratios and bond ratings during both
periods. Weidenbaum surmises that the higher profitability of defense firms is attributable to

24

governmental provision of plant and equipment and progress payments (fixed and working
capital), while the suppressed stock and bond market evaluations relate to the significant
volatility of military requirements which dictate the fortunes of individual defense contractors.
Weidenbaum concludes that the market reflects an increasing distinction between defense and
commercially oriented firms thus supporting his “domestic convergence” between defense
contractors and the state.
In 1970 Agapos and Gallaway’s “Defense Profits and the Renegotiation Board in the
Aerospace Industry” was published. This study estimated statistical profit functions for the
aerospace industry between 1942 and 1967 by employing multiple least squares regression
techniques with a data set of 23 large defense (aerospace manufacturing) firms. The 23 firms
were separated into two groups -- prime contractors with roughly 80% or more of their sales
subject to renegotiation under the Renegotiation Act of 1951, and those with less than 80% (but
more than 50%) of sales subject to renegotiation (Agapos & Gallaway, 1970). The study
investigated two primary issues: defense contractor profitability relative to: 1) demand shifts
during periods of war (World War II, The Korean War, and the Vietnam War); and 2) the
presence of the Renegotiation Board. Agapos and Gallaway draw two main conclusions from
their research. First, they found there is almost no evidence that positive shifts in demand for
military products enable aerospace firms to extract excessive profits. Secondly, they discovered
the Renegotiation Act led to an inflation of aerospace profits that were then largely negotiated
away by the board -- which they posit was a contingency that appeared to become accounted
for by initial contractor pricing in light of renegotiation boards. In conclusion, the scholars
ratiocinate that the justification of the Renegotiation Act is “quite debatable” based on their
findings.
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Arthur Burns reacted to Agapos and Gallaway’s 1970 research article stating that their
conclusions were “dubious--indeed quite likely wrong” (Burns, 1972). He insists that for Agapos
and Gallaway to legitimately establish their conclusions they would have required privileged
data files from the renegotiation board. According to Burns, such files were not available to
them. He further argues that the total profit and aggregate defense expenditure data used by
Agapos and Gallaway did not allow for the necessary segregation of renegotiable and nonrenegotiable sales and profits of the selected companies. Burns also asserts that Agapos and
Gallaway’s data did not support the necessary allocation of net worth and assets to renegotiable
and non-renegotiable business due to aerospace contractors’ heavy reliance on government
plant and equipment and progress payments. Burns then takes aim at the conclusion that
contractors began to “build into contract proposals an additional contingency which can then be
renegotiated away by the board” (Agapos & Gallaway, 1970). He rebuts this conclusion with
three points. First, Burns points out that renegotiation boards examine aggregate fiscal year
profit from all contracts--not individual contracts. Padding individual contracts just enough to
offset renegotiations but not so much to make the aggregate profit perilously susceptible to
renegotiation would be quite difficult. Second, the addition of renegotiable contingencies to
contracts would make them less competitive relative to rival contractors in the initial bidding
process. Thus, unless such action was pervasive, it would seem unlikely. Lastly, Burns notes that
Agapos and Gallaway’s contingency theory views renegotiation as a bargaining process --which
it is not. Burns closes his response to Agapos and Gallaway’s study by describing it as “as
combination of sophisticated econometric techniques and crude statistical data” with the
shortcomings of the latter unrepaired by the former (Burns 1972).
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Stock market investment analysis is another way in which the firm-level performance of
defense contractors has been examined. George Stigler and Claire Friedland used the total
market rate of return to an investor as their primary metric (1971). They select this market value
measure to avoid the practical complications inherent to accounting data--such as segregating
assets and income between a firm’s segments. The total market rate of return represents the
sum of stock price appreciation (or depreciation) and dividends divided by the initial value of the
stock. Stigler and Friedland compared the results of a $1000 investment in each of 54 large
defense contractors’ stocks--with dividends reinvested--to the same such investment in each
stock listed upon the New York Stock Exchange in June 1948. They compared the total market
rate of return of the two previously described investment strategies between the years 19481961 and 1958-1968. Stigler and Friedland conclude that: 1) in the 1950’s investments in
defense contractors were almost twice as profitable as the investments in all listed stocks; 2) in
the 1960’s investments in defense contractor stocks did approximately as well; and 3) in the
1950s total market rate of return for investments in defense firms was positively correlated to
the ratio of defense to total sales (no such relationship in the 1960s). Stigler and Friedland close
with a very brief and tentative assertion that defense business seemed to be somewhat riskier
than commercial business in the 1950s and 1960s.
Bicksler and Hess (1976) assert that Stigler and Friedland’s methodology failed to
consider risk at all. Therefore, they reexamined Stigler and Friedland’s findings by applying the
Capital Asset Pricing Model to the same two investment portfolio sets. Bicksler and Hess
conclude that empirical evidence conflicts with Stigler and Friedland’s conclusions noting that
“the prices and yields of large defense contractors did not have disequilibrium risk-adjusted
returns” and that their relative risk was not significantly different (Bicksler & Hess 1976).
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In 1973, Douglas Bohi acknowledges the divergent defense profit conclusions of
preceding studies by Weidenbaum, Agapos and Gallaway, and Stigler and Friedland--and sought
to clarify the issue. He cites defense profitability as a matter of critical importance because
excessive profit rates waste resources and strain taxpayers while exceedingly low profit rates
threaten the quality and depth of the defense base (Bohi, 1973). Bohi’s study investigated the
profit performance of defense industry firms relative to that of commercially oriented firms
between 1960 and 1969. He constructed a sample of 36 defense firms consistently appearing on
the “Top 100 Defense Contractors” report over his period of study. To be included in the
sample, the firms needed to average 20% or more of their total sales in defense contracts over
between 1960 and 1969. Non-profit firms or those appearing inconsistently on the Top 100 list
were excluded. The list of 36 defense firms was compared against the Fortune 500 largest
manufacturers for the same period. Bohi’s study measured profit as returns on net worth. He
avoided measuring returns on total capital invested because defense firms extensively employ
government supplied capital--not available to commercial firms--at unreported rates. This
precluded constructing an adjusted total capital measure necessary for meaningful profit
comparisons between defense and commercial firms. Net worth however, Bohi contends,
eventually reflects the overall asset-liability structure unique to each firm. First, Bohi conducts a
t-test to determine if the samples’ profit means were drawn from populations with equal profit
means -- he is unable to reject the null hypothesis at the 95% probability level. Therefore, Bohi
concludes that it is unlikely the profit performance between defense and commercial firms is
statistically different. Second, Bohi tests for a correlation between a firm’s percentage of
defense business and its overall profit performance. He finds no apparent relationship between
the two. Third, he considers Weidenbaum’s (1968) “domestic convergence” theory that defense
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business is becoming increasingly concentrated among large firms already rooted in the defense
industry. Bohi finds that between 1960 and 1969 defense contractors had actually been
increasingly diversifying into commercial business with his 36 sample defense firms netting
decreasing average proportions of total U.S. defense procurement dollars during that time.
Lastly, Bohi examines if the Vietnam war has altered the profitability of defense business. He
finds that the profits of both defense and manufacturing oriented firms increased during the
Vietnam war period; but the increases were not significantly different between the groups.
Additionally, Bohi notes that defense contractors’ proportions of defense business fell during
this period--indicating that rising profits were attributable to non-defense business generally
buoyed by war spending.
Grace Pownall was one of the first researchers to extend firm level defense contractor
profit studies into the 1970s (Pownall, 1986). Distinct from previous studies, Pownall did not
provide a comparison between defense and commercial firms. Instead, she analyzed the stock
prices of 88 defense contracting firms between 1968 and 1970 for evidence of capitalized
changes in profitability associated with the establishment of the Cost Accounting Standards
Board (CASB). Pownall notes that in the 1960s most defense contracts were awarded on a costreimbursement basis; and therefore any mandated changes to a contractor’s cost accounting
system would directly impact their present value of future cash flows. The uniform cost
accounting standards to be enforced by CASB would limit a defense contractor’s potential to
overstate reimbursable costs on government contracts--a method whereby defense firms could
extract excess rents from taxpayers for the benefit of shareholders. Pownall’s study examined
two phases of market reaction impacts to shareholder wealth for the 88 firm sample: phase 1,
the time period in which regulators were debating the necessity and feasibility of imposing
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CASB; and phase 2, the period in which the need for CASB was taken as a given and regulatory
debate focused on the scope and nature of regulations to be imposed. Pownall found evidence
of significant contractor shareholder losses associated with phase 1. But, evidence also indicated
the phase 1 losses were reversed by significant phase 2 gains in shareholder wealth. Pownall
further tested and concluded that these responses were uniform small responses across the
sample--not large swings in market value experienced by only a few firms. Pownall concludes
her results suggest investors viewed CASB as an impediment to at least some contractors’ ability
to squeeze excessive cost reimbursements from the government.
In 1989 Mayer-Sommer and Bedingfield propelled the currency of defense industry
profit research into the late 1970s. They studied the period between 1968 and 1977 utilizing
firm-level data to measure profits based on both market returns and accounting returns (MayerSommer & Bedingfield, 1989). They address the choice to avoid using business segment level
data in their research citing previous research (Greer & Liao, 1986) explaining the difficulties in
allocating costs and revenues among defense and commercial segments. Also cited is Peck and
Scherer’s (1962) analysis that commercial segments benefit from their defense segment peers
by: 1) using defense funded work to develop technical skills with commercial applications; 2)
obtaining commercial patent rights stemming from work on military contracts; and 3) enhanced
access to raw materials through defense related activities which also benefit commercial
business processes. Mayer-Sommer and Bedingfield also appear convinced by the work of Bohi
(1973), Fox (1974), and Gansler (1980) which explain specific labor cost (efficiency) benefits
enjoyed by commercial business segments which employ workers originally trained in defense
business segments. Having settled on the use of firm-level data, they investigated 3 measures of
profitability: 1), market returns earned by stockholders; 2) corporate accounting returns; and 3)
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the compensation of corporate top management. The authors note that top management
compensation had yet to be considered as part of defense profit research. Market returns in this
study were measured as dividends and capital gains or losses during each period. Accounting
returns were analyzed as the arithmetic mean of the ratio of a firm’s net income (or loss) to
average stockholders’ equity for each year in the observation period. This accounting measure
provides an approximation of accounting returns to the shareholders--as opposed to Return on
Assets which describes accounting returns to the firm. Mayer-Sommer and Bedingfield targeted
the study period of 1968 to 1977 specifically to compliment and extend extant literature as well
as to include defense activity and disengagement related to the Vietnam war. Additionally-noting Pownall 1986--they selected a starting point prior to potential impacts stemming from
CASB regulatory discussions. The cut-off for the study period was set at 1977 to avoid
complications from regulatory changes in executive compensation disclosures mandated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission taking effect the following year. In selecting their sample of
defense oriented firms, Mayer-Sommer and Bedingfield target companies that met two criteria:
1) the firm needed to be listed at least five times between 1968 and 1977 on the DoD’s list of
The Top 100 Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Military Prime Contract Awards;
and 2) during the years a company appeared on the 100 Companies list, its average percentage
of military prime contract awards to total corporate sales needed to be at least 20%. These
criteria served to exclude firms of questionable defense orientation--i.e., firms with high dollar
volumes of defense sales but low percentages of military sales to total sales. Ultimately, MayerSommer and Bedingfield identified a sample of 27 defense-oriented firms and 71 commerciallyoriented firms. The commercially-oriented firms were paired to the defense-oriented firms
based on matching S&P industry codes, similarity of annual sales, and continued operations over
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the entire study period. Based on their statistical analysis, Mayer-Sommer and Bedingfield
conclude that defense-oriented firms did not yield higher market returns for shareholders
during the period examined. Similarly, they were unable to find significant differences in the
accounting returns of defense and commercially-oriented firms. Finally, Mayer-Sommer and
Bedingfield find that the top management for defense contracting firms enjoyed significantly
higher rates of compensation increases from 1968 to 1977 -- resulting in 1977 compensation
levels eclipsing that of their top manager peers at commercially oriented firms.
Trevino and Higgs noted that although no one had updated the Stigler and Friedland
study (1971) of 1950s and 1960s defense contractor profitability, the controversy regarding such
profitability continued during the 1970s and 1980s (Trevino & Higgs, 1992). Therefore, they
sought to provide their own study of defense contractor profitability. Their principle aim was to
update the analysis of shareholder total market rate of return during 1970 to 1989. Over the
same period, they also evaluated two accounting measures of return (Return on Investment and
Return on Assets), the relative riskiness of defense and commercial firms, and the cumulative
market returns of a defense portfolio compared to a market portfolio. Trevino and Higgs’
defense contractor sample consisted of publicly traded for-profit U.S. corporations listed in the
top 50 on the DoD’s 1979 list of The Top 100 Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of
Military Prime Contract Awards. They use the Standard & Poor’s 500 stocks as a comparative
standard representing the overall market. Trevino and Higgs’ research indicates that “for the
period 1970-1989 as a whole, by every measure, the top defense firms outperformed the
market by a huge margin” (Trevino & Higgs, 1992). For the 1970’s, their sample of defense
contractors posted a similar Return on Investment as the overall market, a slightly better Return
on Assets, and a much better total market rate of return. For the 1980’s, the sample of defense
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contractors posted substantially better Returns on Investment and Returns on Assets than the
overall market and roughly equal total market rate of returns. For the 1970s and 1980s
combined, the defense contractors outpaced the overall market substantially according to
Returns on Investment, Returns on Assets, and total market rate of returns. Because investors in
top defense contractors seized much better total market rates of return than investors in the
S&P 500 over the 20-year study period, Trevino and Higgs next assessed the riskiness between
the two investment strategies. They based this assessment on the computed beta coefficients
according to the Capital Asset Pricing Model. They found that the defense contractor investment
portfolio was no riskier than investing in the overall market. This contradicted Stigler and
Friedland’s (1971) tentative assertion that investing in defense contractors was riskier. Finally,
Trevino and Higgs assessed the differences in cumulative returns between their defense
contractor portfolio and the S&P 500 from 1979 to 1980. They conclude that while the S&P 500
investment portfolio increased in valued by a multiple of 8.19, their sample defense contractor
portfolio posted a multiple of 14.78, representing a far greater return to investors.
Econometric industry segment analysis by Lichtenberg (1992) compliments and extends
the research by Rogerson (1992) and Thomas and Tung (1992)--detailed in the segment
profitability section of this survey--who advanced cost-shifting hypotheses explaining how
defense contractors may become more profitable relative to strictly commercial firms.
Lichtenberg similarly argues that shifting commercial business costs into government business
segments may be a viable method for defense contractors to reduce commercial operating
expenses. He explains that this allows contractors, at the firm level, to be more profitable than
other companies even if the government business segment only earns normal profits.
Lichtenberg asserts, that defense contractor profitability should be examined at the firm level.
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In his study, Lichtenberg directly compares the annual firm-level profit rates (Return on Assets)
of companies engaged at least partially in defense contracting to purely commercial firms across
almost 9,300 industry segments spanning the years 1983 to 1989. His results provide strong
support that defense contractors are substantially more profitable. Based on Lichtenberg’s
calculations, government contractors as a whole earned Returns on Assets that were 68% to
82% greater than commercial firms. He also found that firms intensely involved in government
contracting--whose government sales averaged 84% or more of total sales--earned nearly three
times more Return on Assets than did non-contractors. Lastly, Lichtenberg investigates
Rogerson’s (1992) assertion that accounting rules for overhead allocation incentivize contractors
to employ less capital per worker for producing defense items and more capital per worker for
producing commercial items. His analysis, consistent with Rogerson’s (1992) assertion, indicates
that the capital intensity of government contractors is inversely related to the proportion of
government work they perform.
Using data envelopment analysis, Bowlin (1995) assessed the broad financial condition
of the aerospace-defense industrial base relative to the S&P 500 from 1978 to 1992. To do this
he compared data from between 30-32 defense firms to 38-45 S&P 500 listed commercial firms
(the specific number of defense and commercial firms compared varied each year between
1978-1992). While Bowlin did not singularly consider profit, his financial performance analysis
assessed multiple variables simultaneously to provide a comparison of the overall financial
wellbeing of defense and commercial firms during his study period. Variables considered
included net sales, net income, cash flow from operations, end-of-year market value of equity,
total assets, stockholders’ equity, plant and equipment, and number of employees. Bowlin’s
research indicated that the commercial firms exhibited better financial condition than defense
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firms for the full duration of the study; but the relative financial condition between defense and
commercial firms held steady.
Noting that prior research had left the diversity of profitability among defense
contractors largely unexplored, Zhong and Gribbin investigated factors hypothesized to
contribute to such diversity (2009). Using firm level data from 1984 through 1998, Zhong and
Gribbin employed Ordinary Least Squares regression techniques for their analysis. Three factors
influencing the correlation between the percentage of a firm’s defense sales to its total sales
and the firm’s rate of profits were examined: 1) the risk of defense business; 2) the level of
innovation involved in defense work; and 3) the influence of defense contractors. Zhong and
Gribbin used capital intensity as a proxy for defense business risk, they noted that increased
capital assets committed by a firm correspond to a higher assumed operating risk. Research and
development intensity (reported R&D expenses divided by a firm’s total sales) was used at a
proxy for innovation. Consistent with Karpoff et al. (1999) and McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002),
Zhong and Gribbin consider influence as a degree of market and/or political power wielded by a
defense contractor. The influence of each defense firm is specifically measured as the value of
yearly sales to the government. Zhong and Gribbin’s regression model also controls for specific
industry effects (using Compustat Standard Industrial Classification codes) and size effects
(measured by total firm sales). The empirical results of Zhong and Gribbin’s investigation
indicate that higher percentages of defense sales relative to total sales are related to lower
Return on Assets for a firm -- suggesting that defense work is less profitable than commercial
work for defense contractors. The results also indicate that all three factors of risk, innovation,
and influence are positively associated with the profit rates of defense contractors. Zhong and
Gribbin surmise that the profit link to both risk and innovation seems reasonable while the

35

association between influence and profits of defense contractors is a suggested topic for future
research.
The most recently published literature discovered and reviewed is that by Chong Wang
and Joseph San Miguel, “The Excessive Profits of Defense Contractors: Evidence and
Determinants” (2012). Wang and San Miguel note that the relative historic paucity of academic
research into defense contractor profitability has worsened since the 1990s. This lit review
concurs with their assessment--finding only two other academic studies published since 2000
(McGowan & Vendryzk, 2002; Zhong & Gribbin 2009). In a departure from previous studies,
Wang and San Miguel’s research explicitly investigates whether defense contractors earn
“excessive” profits. And, finding evidence of such profits, they provide alternative predictors
thereof. Their methodology employs “an innovative measure of excessive profit” based upon
matching defense and commercial firms by industry, year, and size. Wang and San Miguel’s data
set is based on 110 publicly traded defense contractors recorded in fedspending.org’s 2008 list
of Top 500 Recipients (by dollar awarded) of Defense Contract Awards. These 110 contractors
from the 2018 list were studied across the 61 year range between 1950 and 2010. The authors
rationalized using the same firms across all 61 years by assuming “significant contracting
relationship continuity between the government and defense contractors”. This yielded 4,099
firm-year observations within the Compustat database. Next, each yearly defense firm
observation was matched to a benchmark--a commercial firm recorded in the same year with a
matching 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification Code. Benchmark size matching was
considered in each of two ways: total assets and total revenue. Wang and San Miguel’s
“excessive” profit measure was then the calculated difference in profit between each defense
contractor firm-year in the sample and the profit of its associated benchmark firm-year. Their
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empirical evidence reveals an average excessive Return on Assets of 1.12% and excessive Return
on Common Equity of 3.65% (each statistically significant at <.01% level) for defense
contractors. They also find an excessive average profit margin ratio of 0.28% (significant at the
5% level) for defense contractors. Lastly, Wang and San Miguel assert that the operating margin
ratio is commonly used by the defense industry to support claims of inferior profitability -- the
average of which was not statistically different between the two groups in their study. Having
established evidence supporting the excessive profitability of defense contractors, Wang and
San Miguel next explore two determinants of such profitability: industry consolidation and poor
corporate governance. Noting significant consolidation within the defense industry after 1992,
Wang and San Miguel regress their measures of excessive profit against a dummy variable
representing either pre-1992 or otherwise. They find that defense contractor Returns on Assets
and profit margin ratios both increased after 1992. This held whether benchmark size was
matched based on total assets or revenue. Wang and San Miguel consider that increased
profitability after the defense industry consolidation starting in 1993 may be the result of either
increased bargaining power or political influence wielded by remaining firms ([Deutch, 2001]
thoroughly details this consolidation). Finally, they explore if “poor corporate governance” is a
determinant of defense contractors’ excessive profitability. One way they operationalize poor
corporate governance is by defense contractors led by a dual-titled CEO and Chairmen of the
Board. The argument being that such a dual-title confers too much power and too little
oversight in a single corporate leadership position. Wang and San Miguel ultimately find that
excessive profitability--measured by both Return on Assets and profit margin ratio--is greater for
firms with CEOs also serving as Chairmen of the Board. This finding held whether size was
considered relative to total assets or revenue.
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Segment Profitability
While firm-level data has been employed to study defense contractor profitability since
the 1960’s the use of segment-level data for profit analysis is a practice that has more recently
evolved--apparently introduced in the academic literature by Greer and Liao in 1986. Greer and
Liao investigate the period 1963 thru 1982 to assess both the risk and returns of defense
contractors during those 20 years. They use regression analysis to disaggregate firm-level rates
of return between the defense and commercial segments of 25 aerospace firms. They explored
both the return on sales and the return on net worth as a function of a firm’s percentage of
defense business. Greer and Liao’s analysis indicate that engaging in defense business negatively
impacted a firm’s overall return rates--measured by either return on sales or return on net
worth. Additionally, they considered the relative profitability between defense and commercial
business for their sample. They found that the return on sales for defense business was
considerably lower than that of commercial business. With the exception of 1976 through 1978,
defense business was also less profitable when measured by return on net worth. The 3-year
period of exception is attributed by Greer and Liao to the issuance of Defense Procurement
Circular 76-3, they claim 76-3 regulated significant changes to DoD’s profit policy that intended
to spur capital investment by defense contractors and increase their potential profit levels.
Hypothesizing that industry capacity utilization rates might be another factor affecting defense
business profits, Greer and Liao conducted further regression testing. This additional analysis
provided strong support--statistically significant at the 5% level--that defense business
profitability by both return on sales and return on net worth was positively related to the
aerospace industry’s capacity utilization rates. Simply put, defense business was more profitable
when the industry was busier and less profitable when it was less busy. Furthermore, they found
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that defense and commercial business approached profit parity as aerospace industry capacity
utilization increased. Finally, Greer and Liao assess the relative risk of defense business from
both a management and a market based view. They considered the volatility of defense
business profits as a management view of risk and concluded that it was higher than that of
commercial business. For a market view of risk Greer and Liao used the Value Line “Price
Stability Index”--which measures volatility of returns in the equities market. This measure
indicated that the market also viewed defense business as riskier than commercial business.
Greer and Liao then provide some commentary as to why firms may be attracted to defense
contracting given the evidence that such business generates lower returns with higher risk. They
speculate that: 1) generous government supplied capital investment for defense contracts
boosts a firm’s return on investment; 2) managers may be pursuing advantageous technology
transfers stemming from defense contracting; 3) securing defense contracts provides a means
by which firms can shift corporate overhead from commercial business to make it more
competitive; and 4) firms may gain a marketing advantage through their association with
producing “state-of-the-art” defense products. Although outside of the scope of this review,
Greer and Liao also provide analysis of weapons systems cost variation relative to capacity
utilization and an examination of capacity utilization as a tool for cost estimation.
In 1992, research by Rogerson, and Thomas and Tung promoted separate cost-shifting
hypotheses to explain how government contractors may generate higher profits than their noncontractor peers. Rogerson establishes a theoretical argument explaining that overhead cost
allocation rules allow--and even incentivize--defense contractors to shift costs from commercial
work onto the government. He explains that defense contracts represent cost-sensitive
revenues for a firm because those products are largely priced based on cost. Alternately,
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commercial work generates cost-insensitive revenues whereby product price is determined by
competitive market forces. Rogerson finds that these opposite revenue streams motivate
defense contractors to substitute direct labor and capital inversely between defense and
commercial segments -- under-capitalizing the production of defense products and overcapitalizing production of commercial items. This means that defense segments will employ
excess direct labor because it is typically the basis for allocating overhead reimbursed by the
government. In due course, this strategy increases total contractor overhead borne by the
government while simultaneously reducing a firm’s commercial business costs (increasing
profits). While Rogerson (1992) detailed overhead allocation cost shifting incentives
theoretically, Thomas and Tung (1992) used empirical evidence to demonstrate the propensity
of defense contractors operating under cost reimbursement contracts to shift pension costs to
the government. Under the pension cost shifting scenario, Thomas and Tung argue that defense
contracting firms can reduce commercial business expenses by overfunding pension plans while
employees work on defense contracts--when costs are reimbursed; later those excess pension
assets are withdrawn as employees perform non-government work. While Thomas and Tung
establish that defense contracting firms fund pensions differently than strictly commercial firms,
they do not address if the pension cost shifting strategy actually results in abnormal defense
contractor profits earned at government expense.
Bowlin (1999) applied data envelopment analysis to assess the financial performance of
defense business segments. This is a different perspective from Bowlin (1995)--which also used
data envelopment analysis--but instead characterized the financial condition of defense
contractors at the firm level. Bowlin (1999) compared the defense-oriented business segments
to the non-defense business segments of 18 firms between 1983 and 1992. The 10-year range of
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data studied by Bowlin (1999) compliments most of that covered by his 1995 study. The 18 firms
were randomly sampled from the “Top 100 defense contractors” for 1989 as published in the
print magazine Government Executive. Business segments were classified as “defense” if over
50% of their total sales were defense related and “non-defense” otherwise. Bowlin (1999) used
data envelopment analysis to develop a financial performance measure of each segment based
on five variables: operating profit, operating cash flows, sales, operating expenses, and
identifiable assets. He also conducted analysis using traditional financial ratios to compare to his
data envelopment analysis findings. Such ratios included Asset Turnover, Return on Sales, CashReturn on Sales, Return on Assets, and Cash- Return on Assets. The results of Bowlin’s (1999)
analyses indicate that the financial performance of defense business segments was distinctly
superior to that of non-defense segments in 1983. Then, from 1983 to 1989 defense segment
performance fell relative to non-defense segments--falling below non-defense segments in
1988. Finally, from 1990 to 1992 Bowlin’s (1999) analyses indicated a recovery trend in the
financial performance of the defense segments--which generally outperformed the non-defense
segments yet again.
In 2002, McGowan and Vendrzyk evaluated the segment profitability of defense
contractors to test the cost shifting hypotheses forwarded a decade earlier by Rogerson (1992),
Thomas and Tung (1992), and Lichtenberg (1992). McGowan and Vendrzyk were specifically
interested in the relationship between excessive defense contractor profits and the ability to
allocate overhead costs from commercial work onto contracted government work using
accepted cost-accounting methods. They theorized that in the pursuit of excess profits, a
defense contractor’s ability to engage in cost shifting is different across its business segments.
To test this relationship, McGowan and Vendrzyk classified three business segments within
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defense contracting firms: 1) segments with only commercial revenues were classified as
“commercial segments”; 2) segments with revenues predominantly attributed to government
contracts were considered “government segments”; and 3) segments with revenues derived
from both sources were labeled “mixed segments”. Along with segment type, McGowan and
Vendrzyk also investigated if the relation between cost shifting behavior and segment
profitability was influenced by either a firm’s market power in the defense industry or the level
of competition for defense contracts. They assert that the greatest opportunity for cost shifting
is manifest within the mixed segments and is less likely to occur in either the commercial or
government segments--or across segments. They also contend that cost shifting opportunities
are positively related to a firm’s market power and inversely related to the level of competition
in the defense contracting market. McGowan and Vendrzyk compiled a sample of 104 defense
contractors and analyzed the associated Compustat business segment file data across two time
periods: 1984 to 1989 and 1994 to 1998. The two time periods were considered to represent
eras of low and high competition respectively for defense contracts. In the sample, contractors
were considered to wield market power if they were ranked in the DoD’s annual report of 100
Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards. Otherwise, they were
not considered to wield market power. Profit was measured by Return on Assets. McGowan and
Vendrzyk’s analysis was completed using a repeated-measures analysis of variance model. They
find that from 1984-1989 (the low competition period) the government segments--with more
than 90% of revenues derived from government work--earned abnormally high Returns on
Assets compared to the mixed or commercial segments. These findings are consistent with
Lichtenberg’s (1992) assertion that the most highly government-oriented contractors are
significantly more profitable. However, from 1994-1998 (the high competition period) McGowan
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and Vendrzyk’s results indicate that there was no significant difference in Return on Assets
between government, commercial, and mixed business segments for defense contractors. This
stabilization of profits between segments in the later period was attributed to decreased returns
in government segments with no significant change in the mixed or commercial segments. Also,
they found that contractors wielding market power were not able to capture excess profits via
cost-shifting in either time period. Therefore, McGowan and Vendrzyk contest Rogerson’s
(1992) and Thomas and Tung’s (1992) assertion that cost-shifting drives excess defense
contractor profitability. Instead, they suggest the non-accounting explanation that low
competition for defense contracts is more likely to explain excess profits earned from
government contracting.
Government Sponsored Studies
Government sponsored studies into defense contractor profitability abound. They have
generated much discussion, and numerous subsequent investigations by academics and
government agencies alike have followed. Such government sponsored studies have failed to
produce a consensus of results either across or between periods of study and have endured a
barrage of criticism regarding both form and substance. In the interest of reasonable concision,
only a select few of the more foundational government sponsored studies are explicitly
reviewed herein. The Logistics Management Institute developed an extensive annotated
bibliography of profit studies--primarily government sponsored--as part of their “Profit ‘76”
study (Department of Defense, 1976). Readers interested in a particularly thorough review of
defense contractor profit research between 1965 and 1975 may be interested in reviewing that
work. No similar compendium of defense contractor profit studies after 1975 was found as part
of this research.
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Logistics Management Institute, Defense Industry Profit Review - 1968
In 1970, the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) published its report for the DoD
examining the profits earned in the defense industry from 1958 through 1968 (1970). The
sample included data from a group of 40 defense contractors. The data was voluntarily provided
by the participating contractors at LMI’s request and delineated assets and net income between
each contractor’s defense and commercial business segments. The study compared separately a
company’s defense business and commercial business to the Federal Trade CommissionSecurities and Exchange Commission (FTC-SEC) universe of 3500 companies; the study depicted
profit in relation to sales, equity capital, and total capital invested. The principal conclusion of
the report was that for 1958-1961 defense business was more profitable than commercial
business within the same company and the FTC-SEC portfolio of companies; the opposite was
true between 1962-1968. However, the results of the report were pointedly questioned for two
reasons: 1) the sample data was not independently collected; and 2) the high likelihood for selfselection bias by participants -- the argument being defense contractors with high profitability
would be less likely to participate in order to avoid public and governmental scrutiny.
Government Accounting Office, Defense Industry Profit Study
The General Accounting Office (GAO)--known as the Government Accountability Office
since 2004--followed LMI with a report of their own in 1971 (1971). The GAO study collected
data spanning 1966 thru 1969 from 74 DoD contractors via questionnaire. Separately, audit data
on 146 DoD contracts--collected directly by GAO investigations occurring throughout that same
period--was also gathered. The contractor furnished data represented overall defense business
while the data gathered from GAO investigations related to individual defense contracts. The
GAO provided profit conclusions based on three measurements: 1) profit as a percentage of
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sales; 2) profit as a percentage of total capital investment; and 3) profit as a percentage of
equity capital investment by stockholders. The GAO concluded that: 1) profit on defense work
(before federal income taxes) measured as a percentage of sales was significantly lower than
comparable commercial work; and 2) profits measured as a percentage of both total capital
invested and equity capital invested were generally not significantly different between defense
and commercial business (defense profits being slightly lower). However these conclusions were
based upon analysis of the contractor self-reported defense business data and not the contract
specific audit data collected by the GAO. When the audit data was examined, it was found that
average rates of return for individual contracts significantly exceeded the average annual profits
rates calculated from the self-reported questionnaire data. For example, Kaun (1988) notes that
the overall rate of return as a percent of total capital on the 146 audited contracts was 28.3%;
but only 11.2% if using the contractor self-reported data. Ultimately, this generated substantial
criticism and cast considerable doubt on the GAO’s conclusions. The GAO defended the use of
the questionnaire data, based on three rationale. First, they note the audit data was not a
representative sample because of its small size relative to total procurement actions during the
period of study (over 180,000 a year). Second, the questionnaire data provided insight from an
overall defense business perspective not an individual contract basis. Lastly, the audit data likely
disproportionately excluded “loss-contracts” with large unsettled claims (which one would infer
to skew profit results positively if excluded).
Logistics Management Institute, Profit ’76
The purpose of DoD’s Profit ’76 study (Logistics Management Institute, 1977) was to: 1)
determine profits of defense contractors on both defense and non-defense business; and 2)
examine the relationship between earnings and capital investments in assets which increase
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productivity and lower costs. This study employed segment-level financial data of 64 large
defense contractors from 1970 through 1974--which was collected and analyzed by a Certified
Public Accounting firm. The study also used data on 5000 durable goods companies provided by
the Federal Trade Commission. It compared defense profitability with that of durable goods
manufacturers and utilized Return on Assets as the principal financial basis of its analysis. Return
on Assets as computed in this study was income divided by assets (less progress payments and
cash). This study was criticized for non-response bias as usable data was received from only
48.1% of defense contractors invited to participate. Ultimately, Profit ’76 concluded that: 1)
defense segments generated profit on sales of 4.7% compared to the 17.1% profit on sales of
commercial segments or 6.7% of durable goods companies; and 2) defense segments generated
13.5% profits on total assets compared to 17.6% for commercial segments and 10.7% durable
goods companies. Jacques Gansler--former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics--noted that this study confirmed “the profits for small defense
companies was much less than for large ones, and that there were very wide variations among
segments of the defense industry.”
Department of Defense, Defense Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR)
The DFAIR Commission assessed “the profitability of defense work and its
reasonableness in comparison with the profitability of the non-defense sector” (U. S.
Government Accountability Office, 2019). DFAIR was accomplished similarly to the Profit ’76
study; relying primarily on self-reported segment-level data from 76 major defense contractors
(a 60.3% response rate) covering 1970 through 1983. This defense sector data was then
analyzed against comparable data from the durable manufacturing industries segment of the
U.S. Commerce Department’s Quarterly Financial Reports for the manufacturing, mining, and
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trade sectors. Also similar to Profit ’76, DFAIR used Return on Assets as the basis of its analysis.
However, unlike the Profit ’76 study which computed Return on Assets as income divided by
assets less progress payments and cash, DFAIR computed Return on Assets as income divided by
total assets less cash -- but including progress payments. DFAIR concluded that the profitability
of defense business was similar to that of commercial business between 1970 and 1979 and
relatively higher than commercial business from 1980 to 1983.
General Accounting Office, Government Contracting: Assessment of the Study of
Department of Defense Contractor Profitability
In 1986 the GAO was tasked to assess the completeness, accuracy, and adequacy of
DFAIR and validate its findings. The GAO agreed with DFAIR’s identification of Return on Assets
as the appropriate financial measure of profitability at the segment level. However, they firmly
denounce DFAIR’s methods of asset valuation and profit calculation. Specifically, the GAO
disagreed with DFAIR’s treatment of progress payments whereby inventories considered to
belong to the government through such payments were included in the asset base when
computing Return on Assets. According to the GAO such treatment is “inconsistent with
conventional financial analysis, generally accepted accounting practices, government contract
provision, and the Profit ‘76 study, which all indicate that progress payments should be
subtracted from assets to determine the asset base in making any Return on Assets calculation”
(U. S. General Accounting Office, 1986). The GAO notes that progress payments should have
been treated as reimbursements to the contractor for expenses incurred--thus offsetting
inventories and accounts receivable and reflecting a contractor’s total asset figures accurately.
By failing to subtract progress payments from assets, DFAIR increased the amount of total assets
used in the denominator of the Return on Assets calculation; this “dramatically” reduces
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calculated Return on Assets--which “results in an inaccurate indication of a company’s
profitability” (U. S. General Accounting Office, 1986). The impact this treatment has on profit
comparisons between defense and non-defense firms is profound. The GAO found that DFAIR’s
progress payment treatment cut defense business Return on Assets by 56%; but only
suppressed commercial manufacturing’s Return on Assets by a mere 4%. The GAO analyzed
DFAIR’s data using the conventional calculation of Return on Assets (progress payments
subtracted from asset base) and found strikingly different results. They concluded that defense
contractors were 35% more profitable than their commercial counterparts from 1970-1979 and
120% more profitable from 1980 to 1983. The GAO also evaluated publicly available data and
found that “defense business was substantially more profitable than comparable non-defense
firms during the period 1975 to 1983” (U. S. General Accounting Office, 1986).
More Recent Government Studies
In 1990, the GAO reported on “Financial Measures for Evaluating Contractor
Profitability” (1990). The report did not assess contractor profitability but rather investigated
which financial measurement would best be employed to that end. It concluded that Return on
Assets--being a ratio of income to assets--is the principal measure that should be employed for
calculating profitability of government contractors. The GAO supports this conclusion for three
reasons: 1) it would provide a basis for measuring the cumulative impact of policies; 2) it can be
computed at the segment level of the firm; and 3) it is derived from auditable, historical
financial data. The GAO notes that when evaluating profitability the defense industry has
generally opposed the use of Return on Assets if progress payments are subtracted from assets.
This stems back to GAO’s 1986 study (U. S. General Accounting Office, 1986) which computed
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Return on Assets in this way and reported significantly higher profitability for defense
contractors as compared to non-defense contractors between 1970 and 1983.
In 1991, the GAO further promoted using Return on Assets to measure defense
contractor profitability citing that Return on Assets also recognizes government financing’s
impact on contractor profit levels (U. S. General Accounting Office, 1991). In 2008 the Institute
of Defense Analysis presented that defense contractors enjoyed low operating margins coupled
with high returns. They contend this was the result of government contract financing partially
funding the extended product cycles of defense contractors (Institute of Defense Analysis,
2008).
In 2019 the GAO published the report “DOD Should Comprehensively Assess How its
Policies Affect the Defense Industry”. Like the title suggests, the report recommends the DoD
conduct a comprehensive assessment regarding the impacts of contract financing and profit
policies on the defense industry. The report further recommends the assessment be updated on
a recurring basis. Within the report GAO highlights the need for an updated assessment and
cites that Office of Defense Price and Contracting officials acknowledge the last comprehensive
study of DoD contract financing and profit policies was completed by the 1985 DFAIR
Commission--over 30 years prior. The DoD reviewed and commented on the 2019 report--and
ultimately concurred with GAO’s recommendation. Additionally, DoD indicated it would pursue
funding in fiscal year 2020 to contract the recommended study.
Conclusion
The United States defense industry has served the country’s military manufacturing and
supply needs during both peace and conflict for over 200 years. During this period, the defense
industrial based evolved from industrial players conscripted into wartime service to divisions
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and corporations voluntarily committed to continuously serving national defense needs,
delivering innovative technologies powering both military and civilian advancement. The
continued existence, and therefor profitability, of this defense base is vital to the nation’s
security. This profitability spurs advancement and innovation and is keenly important to both
taxpayers and shareholders.
Studies attempting to assess defense contractor profitability are challenged by the
multitude of ways in which profit can be operationalized for research. Intricacies inherent to
both accounting and market profitability data have inspired numerous methodologies and
conclusions among researchers. Further complicating the matter, the broad definition of the
term “defense contractor” has supported a wide variety in the scope and treatment of both
sample firms and business segments included in contractor profit studies. Such studies have
therefore produced an extensive variety of results from the 1940s on. Very often, the
conclusions among researchers are contradictory both between and within periods of study.
There is no clear trend in the conclusions reached by defense contractor profit researchers; not
by period of study, publish date, method of analysis, definition of variables, or characterization
of sample. The reasonableness of any research conclusions regarding defense contractor profit
should therefore be individually considered and scrutinized by the reader.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
This chapter develops the hypotheses used to explore the research questions and
explains how they are tested. The components of the model including the period of study and
variables employed are described. Also, justification for each of the model component’s
specification is provided. Lastly, the data and methodology of analysis are discussed.
Hypothesis Development
Numerous previous studies note that the defense marketplace is not described by a
freely competitive model. Instead the mechanisms of free competition are disrupted in the
defense industry by predominant demand-side monopsony and supply-side oligopoly market
structures. The Defense Acquisition System operates under these market structures, which
impact the prices and profits negotiated on defense contracts. The monopsony-oligopoly
structure in the defense marketplace may lead to a scenario whereby defense suppliers leverage
their market and/or political power to realize greater profits from the Department of Defense.
Such a possibility has been explored by previous studies under the captured regulator
framework (Leitzel 1992; Karpoff et al., 1999). Leitzel (1992) concludes that “a regulatory
capture model of the DoD appears plausible.” Karpoff et al. (1999) establish evidence that “the
regulation of procurement fraud works to transfer wealth toward influential defense
contractors.” Additionally, McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002) and Zhong and Gribbin (2009) find
evidence supporting a positive relationship between defense contractor influence and
profitability. The supply-side oligopoly market structure in defense contracting may provide a
complementary explanation linking influence and contractor profit outside the captured
regulator context. Under this construct, the relative scarcity of firms capable of suppling vital
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defense products boosts their influence as the Department of Defense finds itself increasingly
dependent on them. This could then prompt those contractors to charge higher rates--which
provides an explanation for a positive relationship between contractor influence and profit.
Further, defense contractor influence may be of particular interest during the study period of
this research given that DoD procurement budgets generally declined over this period. This
budgetary slide translates to decreased demand for the defense industry which Zhong, Gribbin,
and Qian (2012) note can motivate firms in regulated industries--especially defense--to seek a
competitive edge through focused active lobbying. Lichtenberg (1989) found evidence that more
government-oriented defense contractors (versus commercially oriented) have a higher
propensity to contribute to political action committees (PAC). Specifically, he found that such
contractors sponsored PACs supporting more candidates and with substantially higher average
contributions per candidate. This increased lobbying by defense firms serves to boost their
relative levels of influence within the industry.
H1:

Ceteris paribus, profits earned by defense contractors from defense sales is
positively related to their level of influence in the defense contracting market.
The relationship between defense contractor profits and risk has been considered by

numerous academics (Bohi, 1973; Zhong & Gribbin, 2009; Stigler & Friedland, 1971; Bicksler &
Hess, 1976; Higgs & Trevino, 1992; Brown & Stothoff, 1976; Greer & Liao, 1986; Weidenbaum,
1968; Agapos & Galloway, 1970). The DoD also recognizes the link between contractor profit
and risk and aims to establish equitable returns when pricing negotiated contracts. The Federal
government’s procedures to balance defense contractor risk and reward through negotiated
contracts are codified in the Federal Acquisitions Regulation (FAR) and the Defense Federal
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Acquisitions Regulation Supplement (DFARS). Specifically, DFARS subpart 15-405 Price
negotiation mentions that government contracting officers are to target a contract type and
price that provide contractors the greatest incentive for efficient and economical performance.
The ultimate objective being “a price that is fair and reasonable to both the Government and
the contractor” and that “the negotiation of a contract type and a price are related and should
be considered together with the issues of risk and uncertainty to the contractor and the
Government.” DFARS 15.404-4 explicitly states that contractor profit--as a financial reward--is in
the government’s best interest because it stimulates efficient contract performance, attracts the
best capabilities of qualified business concerns, and maintains a viable industrial base. Thus, the
risk assumed by firms for engaging in defense work should be positively associated with profits.
H2:

Ceteris paribus, profits earned by defense contractors from defense sales is
positively related to their risks from engaging in defense business.
Many previous studies over the last half century have considered the difference in

profitability between defense and commercial business (Weidenbaum, 1968; Stigler & Friedland,
1971; Bicksler & Hess, 1976; Bohi, 1973; Mayer-Sommer & Bedingfield, 1989; Trevino & Higgs,
1992; Lichtenberg, 1992; Bowlin, 1995 & 1999; Zhong & Gribbin, 2009; Wang & Joseph San
Miguel, 2012; Greer & Liao, 1986; McGowan & Vendrzyk, 2002). As previously discussed, the
conclusions reached by these scholars have exhibited great variety. Therefore, it is of substantial
interest to this study to provide a more current assessment of the relative profitability between
defense and commercial business. This will be examined by determining if a significant
relationship is observed during the study period between a contractor’s profitability and their
percentage of total sales attributable to defense. The following null hypothesis is developed:

53

H3:

Ceteris paribus, the profitability of defense contractors is not significantly related
to their percentage of total sales attributable to defense.

Tests of Hypotheses
Hypotheses H1 and H2 are intended to explore separately the effects of “influence” and
“risk” on the correlation between a defense contractor’s profitability and its percentage of
defense sales to total sales. Hypothesis H1 examines if there is a significant relationship
between a defense contractor’s percentage of defense sales to total sales and its profitability.
Consistent with many previous researchers (Weidenbaum, 1968; Agapos & Gallaway, 1970;
Stigler & Freidland, 1971; Bohi, 1973; Bicksler & Hess, 1976; Pownall, 1986; Mayer-Sommer &
Bedingfield, 1989; Trevino & Higgs, 1992; Lichtenberg, 1992; Bowlin, 1995; Zhong & Gribbin,
2009; Zhong, Gribbin, & Qian, 2012; Wang & San Miguel; 2012), this study employs firm level
profitability data and does not consider a contractor’s business-segment level data or figures
related to specific defense contracts. Comparing intra-firm segment returns separated along
defense business and commercial business lines can lead to “intractable accounting problems”
(Trevino & Higgs, 1992). For example, Greer and Liao (1986) note the difficulty in attributing
common costs between a firm’s defense and commercial operations. Bohi (1973) notes the
same challenge in separating profits by defense and commercial business due to the particular
“externalities” of defense business. Bohi’s externalities include: 1) patents from defense work
that are owned by the firm which yield subsequent benefits to commercial business; and 2)
recruiting and training cost for defense business employees who are later retained and
employed for commercial work. Additionally, Zhong and Gribbin (2009) point out that changes
in Securities and Exchange Commission disclosure requirements in 1999 led many firms to
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discontinue reporting segment sales to the government--so examining firm level profits avoids
data availability problems. The use of firm level data also sidesteps complications arising from
potential accounting cost shifting activities described by Lichtenberg (1992), Rogerson (1992)
and Thomas and Tung (1992).
This study assesses hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 following Zhong and Gribbin’s (2009)
approach but uses panel data analysis methods rather than Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression. Hypotheses H1 and H2 will measure if the correlation between the percentage of
defense sales to total sales and the firm’s profit rate varies significantly according to the H1
variable of “influence” or the H2 variable of “risk”. Similar to Zhong and Gribbin (2009),
hypothesis H3--how defense sales impact a firm’s profitability--is assessed by measuring the
significance and estimated correlation between the percentage of defense sales to total sales
and the firm’s profit rate.
Period of Study
A review of the literature highlights the great diversity in methods and operationalized
variables previously employed to understand and quantify the historical profit performance of
defense contractors. However, the absence of any studies examining this topic since 2010 is
striking; therefore the primary motivation for this study is to investigate defense contractor
performance between 2009 and 2018. Exploring this 10-year period is consistent with Bowlin
(1999) who also studies a 10-year period--noting that it should be sufficiently long to capture
business and product cycles affecting both defense and commercial business.
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The study period begins in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis--colloquially known as
The Great Recession--and continues through the subsequent economic recovery. According to
the DoD’s FY2020 Green Book (2019) U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) fell over $510B from
$15.63T in 2008 to $15.12T the following year (FY2012 Constant Dollars). The economy steadily
regained traction thereafter however--with the GDP in 2011 finally surpassing 2008 levels at
$15.69T. GDP continued to grow to $18.34T in 2018. This trend in GDP is reflected in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Real GDP, 2008-2018. (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019)

Defense procurement budgets did not show this same growth trend between 2008 and 2018
however. According to the FY2020 Green Book (2019), Total Obligation Authority for DoD
Procurement dropped from $201.574B in FY2008 to $154.211B in FY 2018 (in FY2020 Constant
dollars). DoD Procurement budgets were projected to drop even further to $143.416B in
FY2024. The trend of U.S. national defense expenditures over the study period is reflected in
Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Real National Defense Expenditures 2006-2018 (U.S.Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019)

Bowlin (1999) acknowledged the potential for defense budget cutbacks to shape the
financial condition of the defense industry. He also recognized that major military operations
and other turmoil in the Middle East impact the financial performance of the defense industry.
This further highlights the importance of studying the decade spanning 2009 to 2018--which
witnessed continued involvement in the Global War on Terrorism sparked by the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Major U.S. military operations during the study period may
potentially impact the U.S. economy, defense budgets, and defense contractor profitability.
Named operations during the study period include Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation
Freedom’s Sentinel in Afghanistan, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn in Iraq,
an Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State along the Syrian-Iraqi Border
(Congressional Research Service, 2019).
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Model
The primary econometric model for analysis in this research is shown in Equation 1.

ROA it = β 0 + β 1 (Influence it * % Defense Sales it ) + β 2 (Risk it * % Defense Sales it )
+ β 3 % Defense Sales it + β 4 Influence it + β 5 Risk it + β 6 Year it + β 7 Size it + β 8 Industry it
+ β 9 DoD Procurement Budget it + β 10 GDP it + U it
Where the subscript designation i refers to the observed cross-sectional unit (the firm);
subscript designation t refers to the time period; ROA is Return on Assets; Influence is the
percent of total DoD prime contract dollars received; % Defense Sales is the percent of total firm
sales attributable to the U.S. Government; Risk is the sum of net property, plant, equipment,
and intangible assets divided by total sales; Year is a set of nine dummy variables corresponding
to each year from 2009-2018; Size is the total annual sales in U.S. dollars for the firm; Industry is
a set of seven dummy variables corresponding to the first two digits of the SIC code for the firm,
DoD Procurement Budget is the nominal DoD procurement budget in U.S. dollars; GDP is the
nominal gross domestic product of the U.S. expressed in dollars; and U is the unobservable error
term.
The component variables of the model are described in the following sections--Table 1
provides a brief summary. Both the cross-sectional and time series nature of this research’s data
set (described later) are reflected respectively in the subscript notational components i and t.
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(1)

Table 1: Definition of Variables
Variable
ROA it
% Defense Sales it

Role
Dependent
Variable
Main Effect
Variable

Influence it

Proxy for
Influence

Risk it

Proxy for Risk

( Influence it × % Defense
Sales it )

Interaction
Variable

( Risk it × % Defense Sales it )

Definition

Interaction
Variable

Year it

Control Variable

Size it

Proxy for Size
Control Variable

Industry it

Control Variable

DoD Procurement Budget it

Control Variable

GDP it

Control Variable

U it

Error Term

Measured as net income divided by total
assets for firm i in year t
Measured as sales to U.S. Government
divided by total sales for firm i in year t
Measured as the percent of total DoD
prime contract dollars received by firm i in
year t
Measured as net property, plant,
equipment, and intangible assets divided by
total sales for firm i in year t
Measured as the product of the
independent variables Influence and %
Defense Sales for firm i in year t
Measured as the product of the
independent variables Risk and % Defense
Sales for firm i in year t
Measured as one of 9 dummy variables
corresponding to each year from 20092018 for firm i in year t
Measured by the total annual sales for firm
i in year t
Measured as one of 7 dummy variables
corresponding to the first two digits of the
SIC code for firm i in year t
Measured as the nominal DoD
procurement budget for firm i in year t
Measured as the nominal U.S. GDP for firm
i in year t
Unobservable error term for firm i in year t

Theorized Model:
ROA it = β 0 + β 1 (Influence it * % Defense Sales it ) + β 2 (Risk it * % Defense Sales it )
+ β 3 % Defense Sales it + β 4 Influence it + β 5 Risk it + β 6 Year it + β 7 Size it + β 8 Industry it
+ β 9 DoD Procurement Budget it + β 10 GDP it + U it
Coefficient of Interest
β1
β2
β3

Hypothesis Tested
H1 explores the effects of “influence” on the correlation
between a defense contractor’s profitability and its percentage
of total sales from defense. A positive β 1 supports H1.
H2 explores the effects of “risk” on the correlation between a
defense contractor’s profitability and its percentage of defense
sales to total sales. A positive β 2 supports H2.
H3 explores how, controlling for other factors, the percentage
of total sales from defense relates to profitability of the firm.
The sign and significance of β 3 drive conclusions related to H3.
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Dependent Variable
Return on Assets (ROA) will be used as the dependent variable to test the three
hypotheses. This ratio is commonly used by investors to gauge how efficiently a company has
used its resources to obtain income. ROA--defined as net income divided by total assets--is an
indicator of corporate financial health and ability to effectively manage assets. ROA is expressed
as a percentage with a higher ROA indicating greater asset efficiency. The use of ROA for
measuring defense contractor profitability is consistent with the GAO’s 1987 and 1990 report
recommendations and numerous academic researchers (Agapos & Gallaway, 1970; Trevino &
Higgs, 1992; Bowlin, 1999; Karpoff, Lee, & Vendrzyk, 1999; McGowan & Vendrzyk, 2002; Zhong
& Gribbin, 2009; Wang & San Miguel, 2012). The GAO (1990) describes that ROA is the most
desirable measure of contractor profitability for three reasons: 1) it provides a basis to measure
the cumulative impacts of government procurement policies; 2) it can be computed at the
segment level; and 3) it is easily derived from historical, financial, and audited data.
Other traditional profitability measures were considered but ultimately dismissed for
this analysis. As the GAO (1990) notes, Return on Sales is a less desirable profit measure than
ROA because it is based on output rather than input values and provides no measure of how
effectively a firm invests its capital. Return on Equity (ROE)-- defined as net income divided by
shareholder equity--was eliminated from this analysis because it can be easily manipulated by
the firm. ROE can be artificially boosted by increasing reliance on debt financing or reducing the
number of outstanding shares. Since debt financing is not captured by ROE’s denominator, the
risk of overleveraging can be obfuscated. Alternatively, share repurchases can also be used by
corporate management to increase ROE by decreasing the denominator. Further, the GAO
(1990) found that ROA could also be an acceptable surrogate for ROE. They tracked ROA and
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ROE for the S&P Industrials index--an index commonly associated with the defense industry-over a period of 18 years and concluded that the two ratios moved in tandem. Finally, using ROA
as a profit measure is also consistent with Mayer-Sommer & Bedingfield’s (1989) conjecture that
Congress, the press, and the public all rely more heavily on accounting measures of profitability
than on market measures such as share price.
Moderating Independent Variables
Influence
Prior defense contractor profit literature has considered the effect of contractor
influence on profits. Scherer (1964) outlines that in the defense market, contractors selected to
provide defense goods acquire highly specialized physical and intellectual assets through the
servicing of their contracts. Scherer (1964) further describes that servicing previous contracts
could increase a contractor’s bargaining power for winning future contracts as the government’s
previous commitment may restrict the ability to shop around for alternative contractors. The
contract servicing scenario described by Scherer (1964) thus appears to link a defense
contractor’s execution of government contracts with increases in relative bargaining power
within the defense marketplace. Later scholars seem to accept Scherer’s linkage between
government contract fulfillment and increased bargaining power as logically synonymous with
increased market influence. Studies by Karpoff et al. (1999) and McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002)
both employed the Department of Defense’s annual report of 100 Companies Receiving the
Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards as a way of identifying influential defense
contractors. Firms not listed in the top 100 ranking were considered non-influential by both
studies. Karpoff et al. (1999) state that “a firm’s presence in the Top 100 list attests to its
success in obtaining defense contract awards and, therefore, its influence within the DoD.”
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Zhong and Gribbin (2009) similarly considered contractor influence but instead measured
influence by a defense contractor’s total annual sales to the Government. Zhong and Gribbin
(2009) noted their measure of influence as consistent with that used by Karpoff et al. (1999) and
McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002) however because “a large volume of prime contract awards
results in a large amount of sales to the DoD in the awarding and/or the following years.” Like
Karpoff et al. (1999), McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002), and Zhong and Gribbin (2009), this study
also accepts the link between prime contract award volumes and contractor influence.
Specifically, the proxy for influence is measured as the percentage of DoD total prime contract
award dollars received by a firm in each year.
Risk
Previous research has noted that engaging in defense contracting business represents a
type of operational risk assumed by the firm with no measure available to quantify it directly
(Zhong & Gribbin, 2009). To proxy for the operating risk of defense contractors, Zhong and
Gribbin (2009) used capital intensity -- defined as the sum of net property, plant, and equipment
(PPE) and intangible assets divided by total sales. They reasoned that operating risk for defense
contracting is positively related to capital asset commitment because high capital intensity is
associated with high fixed costs relative to total costs. They further explain that demand
decreases for defense products have disproportionately negative impacts on profits of defense
contractors with higher levels of capital intensity. Greer and Liao (1986) echo this idea in their
study of defense market profitability noting that “when demand falls, firms (particularly those
with larger fixed costs) should engage in vigorous price competition to attract business.” Miller
and Bromiley (1990) also highlight that capital intensity contributes to a firm’s risk through the
possibility of capital obsolescence – when technological change devalues capital investments.
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The idea that facilities and equipment investments represent a business operating risk borne by
defense contractors also appears consistent Federal acquisition publications. The Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) and the Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI) have jointly developed a
set of reference volumes known as the Contract Pricing Reference Guides (CPRG). The CPRG
serve as instructional guidance for federal contracting personnel and provide examples of
applying pricing policies to pricing problems. The CPRG explicitly notes that defense contractors
considering entering into a contract with the Government must take into account the risk of
various contract obligations--one such risk being investment risk. The CPRG defines investment
risks as “costly investments for such things as facilities, equipment, and materials” that
contractors may have to make in order to perform on a contract. This definition is also in line
with the Defense Financial Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) which directs
Government contracting officers to consider capital investment as part of a profit-analysis
factor. The capital investments factor takes into account the contribution of contractor
investments to contract performance (DFARS 15-404, (d), (iv)). This suggests that these capital
investment contributions from contractors are a business operating risk to be compensated for
in profit negotiations. The CPRG further links capital investments such as property, plant, and
equipment as operating risks faced by contractors in detailing the uses of government furnished
property (GFP). The CPRG states “Government furnished property is one way [contracting
officers] can reduce the risk to the contractor and thus make a contract more attractive. GFP,
including Government-owned equipment, facilities, and materials, provided to the contractor can
lower contract costs by shifting investment risk from the contractor to the Government.” Using
capital intensity to proxy defense contractor operating risk is justified on the basis of: 1) the
precedent of such a proxy in previous research; and 2) the connection between risk and
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facilities, equipment, and materials investments plainly noted in Federal acquisition regulations
and associated instructional guidance publications. Therefore, this study adopts Zhong and
Gribbin’s (2009) capital intensity proxy of operating risk--defined as the sum of net PPE and
intangible assets divided by total sales.
Main-Effect Independent Variable
The percentage of defense sales to total sales will be used as the main effect
independent variable for the profitability of defense contractors. Sales to the U.S. Government
and total sales figures for defense contractors are found in publicly available annual corporate
10-K filings to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Here, sales to the government are
considered synonymous with defense sales since defense sales account for the majority portion
of all sales to the U.S. Government (consistent with Lichtenberg, 1992; Thomas & Tung, 1992;
McGowan & Vendrzyk, 2002; Zhong & Gribbin 2009; and Zhong, Gribbin, & Qian, 2012). The sign
and significance of the correlation between a firm’s percentage of defense sales and its profit
will indicate generally if defense or commercial business is more profitable.
Control Variables (Year, Industry, Size, DoD Procurement Budget, GDP)
McGahan and Porter (2002) studied the variance in accounting profitability across a
broad cross-section of American firms and concluded that both year and industry are important
controls for accounting profitability. Year is included in the model to control for the potential
time trend of general economic growth each year post-2008 as well as political cycles such as
elections that may affect the defense industry. The year variable is represented by one of nine
dummy variables corresponding to each year from 2009 to 2019. Albuquerque (2009) echoes
McGahan and Porter’s (2002) suggestion to consider industry when studying firm performance.
In line with prior research, industry specific effects will be controlled for in this model (Mayer-
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Sommer & Beddingfield, 1989; Lichtenberg, 1992; McGowan & Vendrzyk, 2002, Zhong &
Gribbin, 2009, Wang & San Miguel, 2012). Gansler (1980) highlights that the defense industry is
not a single industry but rather an assortment of many different industries with significant
sectoral differences. The sectoral characteristics impacting defense contractors are thus unique
to their specific industry membership. The industry variable will take on one of eight values
corresponding to the first two digits of each firm’s Standard Industrial Classification code (SIC
code). SIC codes are a four-digit classification system used to categorize U.S. businesses by
industry with the first two digits identifying the businesses Major Group as detailed in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Example Breakdown of SIC Code 7373

In addition to controlling for industry, previous scholars (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker,
1999; Albuquerque, 2009) have noted the importance of controlling for size effects on firm
performance. The control variable for the size effect is measured by the total annual sales for
each firm--consistent with previous defense contractor profit research (Zhong & Gribbin, 2009;
and Wang & San Miguel, 2012). Annual DoD procurement budgets are included in the model to
control for changes in aggregate demand for defense related goods and services from year to
year. Similarly, U.S. GDP is included in the model to control for macroeconomic realities
impacting firm performance.
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Sample and Data Collection
The original target sample for this research included all publicly traded U.S. defense
contractors listed on the annual Top 100 DoD Contractors Report for each year between 2009
and 2018. An excerpt of the 2018 report is shown in Figure 4. The inclusion/exclusion criteria for
the sample data set is summarized in Table 2 and described in the following text.

Figure 4: Excerpt of 2018 Top 100 Contractors Report (DoD)

Parameter

Table 2: Sample Data Set Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria
Inclusion Criteria
Exclusion Criteria

Time Period

2009 - 2018

Periods before 2009 or after 2018

Publicly traded and headquartered in the
United States
Listed in annual Top 100 DoD Contractors
Report
Income Statement and Balance Sheet
available on Yahoo! Finance, and
government sales reported in annual 10-K
report as either nominal value of % of
total sales
Two or more firm-year observations
during study period

Foreign firms, privately held firms, notfor-profit organizations
Not Listed in annual Top 100 DoD
Contractors Report
Income Statement and Balance Sheet not
available on Yahoo! Finance (delisted
firms), or government sales not reported
in annual 10-K report as either nominal
value of % of total sales
Only 1 firm-year observation during study
period

Firm Type
Defense Contractor

Financial Data

Firm Observation Periods

Targeting the top 100 DoD contractors over a 10-year period yields a maximum
potential data set of 1000 contractor-year observations. The period of study served as the initial
exclusion criteria for the sample and has been previously described. The second exclusion
criteria of targeting only firms listed on the annual Top 100 Contractors report was selected for
two reasons. First, the Top 100 report serves as a way to identify defense contractors that would
logically be considered most important from the U.S. government’s point of view as well as
those contractors for whom defense business is a significant concern from the firm’s point of
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view. Top 100 firms are primary contributors to the defense industry whose continued business
interests are likely to be substantially tied to the success of their DoD contracting operations.
Second, the Top 100 list was widely employed in prior research it was also used in this research
to lend some degree of similarity with previous studies. Next, private firms were excluded from
the target sample because their financial statements are not typically available publicly. Nonprofit organizations were also excluded from the target sample. Although there are non-profits
which have contracting relationships with the DoD, the business and market mechanisms they
operate under are significantly different than those faced by for-profit firms--and are thus
outside the scope of this research. Because this research is focused on U.S. defense contractor
profitability, foreign firms were also excluded from the target sample.
Excluding private firms (244 observations) such as Redstone Defense Systems and
Afognak Native Corporation decreased the sample to 756 contractor-year observations.
Excluding non-profits (62 observations) like Johns Hopkins University and foreign firms (166
observations) such as the Rolls-Royce Corporation further decreased the sample observations
from 756 to 528. The data set now contained only the Top 100 publicly traded U.S. defense
contractors for each of the years between 2009 and 2018, and listed (1) the total contract
dollars obligated to each contractor for each year and (2) the percent of total DoD procurement
obligations captured by each contractor in each year. With the sample data set initially scoped
according to the preceding discussion, the collection of corporate financial data for each firm
began.
Yahoo! Finance Premium was the database used for collecting historical financial data
such as total revenue, net income, and total assets (among myriad other figures) from the
annual Income Statements and Balance Sheets of each of the sample firms. Additional
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reductions to the sample dataset resulted from limitations in Yahoo! Finance’s database. The
database did not contain information for any companies not currently traded. This limitation
therefore eliminated from the sample data set any company that was delisted since being
published in a previous Top 100 Contractors report. Reasons a company may have been delisted
include ceasing operations, declaring bankruptcy, merging with another company and adopting
their name, or becoming a private corporation. After accounting for this limitation to the Yahoo!
Finance database, the sample data set now totaled 376 firm-year observations.
The next datapoint needed to be collected was the total sales to the U.S. government
for each of the remaining firm-year observations. Collecting this information required manually
searching each contractor’s Annual 10-K Report. Each 10-K report is filed with the SEC and made
available online through their Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system
(EDGAR). 10-K reports provide a detailed summary of a company’s financial condition to include
audited financial statements. Each 10-K report is organized into 4 main parts and 15
subcomponents--one subsection reports business segment information which often details sales
to the U.S. government. The reporting requirements for the “Segment Reporting” subsection are
outlined by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Accounting Standards Codification
(ASC) Topic 280. Because of the uniqueness of each firm’s business operations, they are not
specifically required in all circumstances to provide a detailed accounting of the firm’s sales to
the U.S. government. Therefore, the data set was again reduced by those companies for which
government sales were not reported. It is important to note that most contractors reporting
sales to the U.S. government provide the dollar value of such sales. However, several
contractors--such as Leidos Holdings Inc.--only report the percentage (sometimes provided as an
approximate) of the firm’s total revenues attributable to the U.S. government. In such cases, the
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dollar value of government sales was calculated from this percentage and the firm’s total sales.
Consequently, any calculations employing approximate sales percentages would slightly reduce
the accuracy of numbers used in the data set. Additionally, one contractor (The Boeing
Company) reported annual sales to the U.S. Government which included foreign military sales
brokered through the U.S. Government. No additional accounting information was available to
exclude such foreign military sales from sales specifically attributable to the U.S. Government as
the end customer. Therefore, if such sales figures were accepted some unspecified amount of
measurement error would be introduced into the data set. After consideration, Boeing’s
government sales figures were admitted to the data set. This was based on the reasoning that
the U.S. Government--not foreign militaries--is likely the end customer for the majority of the
annual sales figures in question. This reasoning is supported by the logic that since Boeing is
headquartered in the U.S., they would be primarily subject to U.S. laws limiting their business
dealings abroad. Further, since the sales in question relate to products with a military
application it is reasoned that such sales activities to foreign militaries would be very
significantly restricted.
Finally, three firms with just a single observation were removed from the data set. This
was because panel data techniques (described in the following section) will be used to analyze
the dataset and such techniques require at least two observations from each cross-sectional
unit (firm). After addressing all exclusion criteria and data limitations, the final sample data set
identified 27 individual firms across 209 firm-year observations. Of the 27 firms, 13 were Top
100 contractors for each of the 10 years between 2009 and 2018. Lockheed Martin was the top
contractor by total dollars obligated for each of the 10 years studied. Industrial classifications of
firms in the sample spanned 17 unique 4-digit SIC codes and 8 different Major Groups.
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Panel Data Analysis
The previously described sample data set has a unique structure making it distinctly
suited for panel data analysis -- that is, the sample is a cross-section of defense contractors
observed over multiple periods of time. Because panel data models describe individual behavior
both across time and across individuals, they are well suited for studying the dynamics of
change (Gujarati, 2004). The general population regression model using panel data is written as:
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + … + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,

(2)

where y is the value of the dependent variable and subscripts i and t refer to the individual
(firm) and time period respectively, 𝛽𝛽0 is the intercept, 𝛽𝛽1 through 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 represent the marginal

effect that a change in independent variable x 1 through x k respectively has on y holding all other

independent variables constant, and u represents the error or unobservable term. The error
term contains much information including both true randomness and factors that affect the
dependent variable that are not accounted for by one of the independent variables. As noted by
Hilmer and Hilmer (2014), because of the spatial-temporal nature of panel data the error terms
are different in each period. Therefore, there exists the possibility that the composition of the
error terms changes over time. Allowing for the potential of some but not all of the components
of the error term to change over time, the error term for panel data is more explicitly specified
as:
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) ,

(3)

where 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a composite error term for individual (firm) i in time period t, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is a time-invariant

component that varies across individuals but not time periods, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a time-variant

component that varies across both individuals and time. Hilmer and Hilmer (2014) explain two
important assumptions made regarding the time-variant and time-invariant components of the
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error term. First, the time-invariant component of the error term is assumed to be correlated to
the independent variables of the population regression model. Second, it is assumed that the
time-variant component of the error term is not correlated with the independent variables for
any time period in the population regression model. These assumptions are foundational to
selecting the most appropriate estimation technique for panel data sets. There are four primary
estimation techniques for panel data: pooled models, first-differenced models, fixed effects
models, and random effects models.
Pooled Cross-Section Analysis
While it would be possible to estimate an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
model by combining the data from all 10 years of the study period into one large cross-section,
this technique would forgo the considerable analytical insights afforded by considering both the
spatial and temporal dimension inherent in the panel nature of the sample data set (Hilmer &
Hilmer, 2014). This model produces constant (identical) coefficients for intercepts and slopes for
every individual (firm) observed (Gujarati, 2004). Therefore, this estimation technique is not
targeted for use by this research.
First-Differenced Models
First-differenced models are a way to control for time-period differences in panel data.
In first-differencing the values of the dependent and independent variables in time period t-1
are subtracted from the associated values in time period t (Hilmer & Hilmer, 2014). This process
removes the time-invariant component from the error term. Because the time-invariant
component of the error term is assumed to be correlated with the independent variables,
removing it by differencing allows for unbiased estimates (Hilmer & Hilmer, 2014). Essentially,
this is a way to consider the specific nature or “individuality” of the observed cross-sectional
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units (firms) that does not change over time. One limitation of first-differencing is that it is
impossible to estimate marginal effects of independent variables that are either constant across
time periods (e.g., gender) or increase by a fixed amount over time (e.g., age).
Fixed-Effects Models
Fixed-effects models are another method of removing the time-invariant component of
the error term in panel data. This can be done by estimating a “constant-free” model (no
intercept) by including a dummy variable representing every cross-sectional unit (firm) observed
in the sample. Hilmer and Hilmer (2014) explain that this technique removes the individualspecific component from the error term by controlling for it directly in the regression model. If
the number of individuals (firm) in the sample is large however, this method may become
tedious and consume large numbers of degrees of freedom. Hilmer & Hilmer (2014) also detail a
second way to estimate a fixed-effect model through a process referred to as “demeaning”.
Demeaning removes the time-invariant component of the error term--or individual effect--by
subtracting the average value of each individual (firm) from the observed values of each
observation for each individual (firm) for the dependent variable and all independent variables.
The results of either first-differencing or fixed-effects modeling are equivalent (Mundlak, 1978).
Like first-differencing models, fixed-effect models cannot estimate marginal effects of
independent variables that are either constant across time or increase by a fixed amount over
time.
There are many ways in which the defense contracting firms in the sample data set may
be individually unique thus making fixed-effect panel analysis useful. The firms may have
different corporate cultures or value sets that may affect profitability yet are difficult to quantify
specifically. Management style and talent as well as leadership aversion to or acceptance of risk
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are likely to vary uniquely between firms. The aggregate morale, talent, and commitment of
employees may vary in ways that impact profitability. Also, there may be certain time-effects in
a panel data set of contractor profit; this might be thought of as an “individual effect” of specific
time periods. United states electoral cycles, the timing of implementation of laws and policies,
and shifting geo-political and economic realities could be instances that make a time period
individually unique in the way it impacts contract profits between periods. Similar to the idea
that there may be something about corporate culture (individual effect) that is difficult to
quantify but nonetheless does impact profitability, there may be something about the nature of
one time period that effects profitability differently than other periods. In light of these
potential individual and time effects, fixed-effects modeling will be the primary method of
analysis in this research.
Random-Effects Models
If the time-invariant component of the error term is not correlated to the independent
variables, first-differencing and fixed-effect models which remove the time-invariant component
from the model are unnecessary. Because they control for--but do not completely remove--the
time-invariant component of the error term, random-effects panel models provide a way of
generating efficient and unbiased estimates for instances when the time-invariant component is
not correlated to the independent variables (Hilmer & Hilmer, 2014). Random-effects models
might be inappropriate for most economic applications because there is seldom an instance
where the time-invariant component of the error term (specific nature of firm) is not correlated
to one or more of the independent variables (Hilmer & Hilmer, 2014). Additionally, Wooldridge
(2010) notes that “in many applications, the whole point of using panel data is to allow for (the
time-invariant component of the error term) to be arbitrarily correlated with the (independent
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variables)” and that “a fixed-effects analysis achieves this perfectly.” For detailed explanations
of panel data techniques, readers are referred to Gujarati, 2004; Hilmer & Hilmer, 2014; or
Wooldridge, 2010.
Summary
This chapter developed the hypotheses used to explore the research questions and
explained how they are to be tested. The model, its component variables, and the period of
study employed have also been described. Additionally, justification for each of the model
component’s specification was provided. Lastly, the data and methodology used to analyze the
data were discussed. The following chapter will cover analysis and results.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
This chapter presents the analysis conducted according to the methodology presented
in the previous chapter and examines the results. Statistical analysis was conducted using R, an
open source software for data manipulation and statistical computing and modeling (R Core
Team, 2019). Panel analysis was conducted using the “plm” package in R (Croissant & Millo,
2018).
Baseline Model - Twoway Fixed Effects
As described in Chapter 3, it is hypothesized that in the panel data set of contractor
profit, both individual and time fixed effects may be significant. Therefore, the “twoway” model
which accounts for both individual and time fixed effects will serve as the baseline for beginning
analysis in R with the plm package. The twoway fixed effects model is specified as follows:
ROA it = β 0 + β 1 (Influence it * % Defense Sales it ) + β 2 (Risk it * % Defense
Sales it )

(4)

+ β 3 % Defense Sales it + β 4 Influence it + β 5 Risk it + U it ,

where the variable definitions are the same as described in Table 1. In the twoway fixed effects
model, the “Industry” variable from Equation 1 is necessarily excluded because it does not vary
for an observed firm across time periods. Similarly, the “GDP” and “DoD Procurement Budget”
variables are necessarily excluded because they do not vary between firms in a given time
period. Also, the two aforementioned variables would be logically subsumed into the modeling
effect for time fixed effects--which controls for differences across years. The theorized “Size”
variable from Equation 1 is also excluded because it is logically subsumed into the individual
fixed effect controlled for in the twoway fixed effect model. Here, the ability of each defense
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contracting firm to leverage their size in pursuit of profits is theorized to be an individual fixed
effect specific to each firm. This size leveraging capability would then be included in the timeinvariant component of the composite error term U it which is correlated with each independent
variable. As shown in Figure 5, the p-values of the “Influence” variable and “Influence x Defense
Sales” interaction term, as well as that of the overall model are significant at the 0.05 level in
the twoway fixed effects model.
Coefficients:
PctDefenseSales
InfluenceXDef
RiskXDef
Risk
Influence
--Signif. codes:

Estimate Std. Error t-value
0.021072
0.042101 0.5005
-3.134307
1.457213 -2.1509
-0.044996
0.149389 -0.3012
-0.136794
0.087731 -1.5593
2.126842
0.876033 2.4278

Pr(>|t|)
0.61736
0.03291 *
0.76363
0.12082
0.01625 *

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Total Sum of Squares:
0.21818
Residual Sum of Squares: 0.20093
R-Squared:
0.079081
Adj. R-Squared: -0.14019
F-statistic: 2.88529 on 5 and 168 DF, p-value: 0.015848
Figure 5: Twoway Fixed Effect Model Output

Considering Significance of Individual and Time Fixed Effects Separately
After the twoway model of both individual and time fixed effects was shown to be
significant overall, the next step in analysis was to separately check if individual fixed effects
were significant and if time fixed effects were significant. The individual fixed effects only model
is also specified by Equation 4. As shown in Figure 6, the p-values of the “Influence” variable and
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“Influence x Defense Sales” interaction term, as well as that of the overall model are still
significant at the 0.05 level--slightly more so than in the twoway effects model.
Coefficients:
PctDefenseSales
InfluenceXDef
RiskXDef
Risk
Influence
--Signif. codes:

Estimate Std. Error
0.0280249 0.0396983
-3.6292684 1.3967516
-0.0075699 0.1485803
-0.1499619 0.0848424
2.3118914 0.8453940

t-value
0.7059
-2.5984
-0.0509
-1.7675
2.7347

Pr(>|t|)
0.481149
0.010156 *
0.959424
0.078862 .
0.006879 **

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Total Sum of Squares:
0.23452
Residual Sum of Squares: 0.21599
R-Squared:
0.079014
Adj. R-Squared: -0.082289
F-statistic: 3.03706 on 5 and 177 DF, p-value: 0.011767
Figure 6: Individual Fixed Effects Model Output

An F test for twoway fixed effects versus individual fixed effects only--shown in Figure 7-yields a p-value of 0.1922. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis at 0.05 level of
significance and conclude there is no significant time effects. A Breusch-Pagan (1980) Lagrange
Multiplier Test for time effects--Figure 8--yields a p-value of 0.794 and similarly dictates failure
to reject the null hypothesis thus concluding there is no significant time fixed effects.
F test for twoways effects
data: ROA ~ PctDefenseSales + InfluenceXDef + RiskXDef + Risk
+ Influence + ...
F = 1.3988, df1 = 9, df2 = 168, p-value = 0.1922
alternative hypothesis: significant effects
Figure 7: F test for Twoway Fixed Effects Versus Individual Effects Only

Lagrange Multiplier Test - time effects (Breusch-Pagan)
for unbalanced panels
data: ROA ~ PctDefenseSales + InfluenceXDef + RiskXDef + Risk
+ Influence
chisq = 0.068169, df = 1, p-value = 0.794
alternative hypothesis: significant effects
Figure 8: Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test for Time Fixed Effects
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Next, a pooled model is created to test for significant individual fixed effects. As
explained in Chapter 3, a pooled model is essentially a regular OLS regression model that
assumes a constant intercept and slope regardless of the firm or time period observed. The
pooled model is also specified by Equation 4--albeit with the regular OLS assumptions on the
error term. The output for the pooled model is shown in Figure 9.

Coefficients:
(Intercept)
PctDefenseSales
InfluenceXDef
RiskXDef
Influence
Risk
--Signif. codes:

Estimate Std. Error
0.0493535 0.0084075
0.0277766 0.0133228
-1.5991337 0.4964192
-0.0212289 0.0626593
0.8661947 0.3400535
-0.0521016 0.0380013

t-value Pr(>|t|)
5.8702 1.753e-08 ***
2.0849 0.038329 *
-3.2213 0.001486 **
-0.3388 0.735112
2.5472 0.011599 *
-1.3710 0.171873

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Total Sum of Squares:
0.34588
Residual Sum of Squares: 0.30465
R-Squared:
0.1192
Adj. R-Squared: 0.097507
F-statistic: 5.49453 on 5 and 203 DF, p-value: 9.1094e-05
Figure 9: Pooled Model Output

An F test for individual effects--shown in Figure 10--yields a p-value less than the 0.05 level of
significance. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude there is statistically
significant support for individual fixed effects in the panel data set.

F test for individual effects
data: ROA ~ PctDefenseSales + InfluenceXDef + RiskXDef + Influence
+ ...
F = 2.7946, df1 = 26, df2 = 177, p-value = 3.63e-05
alternative hypothesis: significant effects
Figure 10:F Test for Individual Fixed Effects
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Testing for Random Effects
Next a random effects model--also specified by Equation 4--was generated to conduct
specification testing. The random effects model was tested against the individual fixed effects
model previously shown to be statistically significant. In R, random effects models for
unbalanced panel data sets can be computed using one of three estimator transformations:
"swar" (Swamy & Arora; 1972), "amemiya" (Amemiya; 1971), "walhus" (Wallace & Hussain;
1969). The output of the random effects model using the “swar” estimator is shown in Figure
11.

Effects:
var
std.dev share
idiosyncratic 0.0012203 0.0349322 0.779
individual
0.0003472 0.0186325 0.221
theta:
Min. 1st Qu. Median
Mean 3rd Qu.
0.2017 0.4475 0.4900 0.4560 0.4900

Max.
0.4900

Residuals:
Min.
1st Qu.
-0.274266 -0.012646

3rd Qu.
0.016185

Median
Mean
0.004671 -0.000016

Max.
0.116736

Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error z-value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)
0.0499127 0.0121620 4.1040 4.061e-05 ***
PctDefenseSales 0.0285256 0.0190331 1.4987 0.133943
InfluenceXDef
-2.1369637 0.7446292 -2.8698 0.004107 **
RiskXDef
0.0075418 0.0865045 0.0872 0.930525
Influence
1.2547273 0.5033704 2.4927 0.012679 *
Risk
-0.0784291 0.0500789 -1.5661 0.117323
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Total Sum of Squares:
0.27138
Residual Sum of Squares: 0.24638
R-Squared:
0.092131
Adj. R-Squared: 0.06977
Chisq: 20.6002 on 5 DF, p-value: 0.00096374
Figure 11: Random Effects Model Output (Swarmy-Arora's Transformation)
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Hausman’s specification test for random effects models (Hausman, 1978) was used to
determine which model was the correct specification for this research’s data set--the individual
fixed effects model or the random effects model. The results of the Hausman specification test
are shown in Figure 12.
Hausman Test
data: ROA ~ PctDefenseSales + InfluenceXDef + RiskXDef + Influence +
...
chisq = 5.0038, df = 5, p-value = 0.4154
alternative hypothesis: one model is inconsistent
Figure 12: Hausman Specification Test Results

Based on the Hausman test we fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level of significance
and conclude that the random effects model is the correct specification. This means that there is
no statistically significant support that the time-invariant component of the error term, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 , is

correlated with the regressors. While Figure 12 displays the Hausman specification test results
comparing the individual fixed effects model to the random effects model using the “swar”
estimator, the interpretation of results is not impacted by alternatively using the “amemiya” or

“walhus” random effects estimator transformations -- which yield Hausman specification test pvalues of 0.3666 and 0.4158 respectively.
After concluding that the random effects model is correctly specified over the individual
fixed effects model, a comparison to the pooled OLS model is necessary to determine if random
effects are indicated or if there is no panel effect and the OLS model is better. The BreuschPagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier Test for random effects is employed for this purpose via the
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“plmtest” in R. The results of this test, shown in Figure 13, indicate that at the 0.05 level, there is
statistically significant evidence of random panel effects.
Lagrange Multiplier Test - (Breusch-Pagan) for unbalanced panels
data: ROA ~ PctDefenseSales + InfluenceXDef + RiskXDef + Influence +
...
chisq = 22.925, df = 1, p-value = 1.684e-06
alternative hypothesis: significant effects
Figure 13: Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test for Random Effects

Model Selection Recap
At this point in the panel data modeling process, the analysis has concluded that the
random effects model is indicated. Analysis started with a theoretically supported twoway (time
and individual) fixed effects model. An F-test and Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test for
time effects both failed to indicate statistically significant support for time fixed effects. Next, a
separate F-Test did indicate statistically significant support for individual fixed effects.
Therefore, a Hausman test was then employed to determine which model was the correct
specification for this research’s data set; the individual fixed effects model, or the random
effects model. The Hausman test provided statistically significant evidence that the random
effects model was appropriate. Finally, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test for random
effects indicated that there is a statistically significant random effect in the panel data set; and
therefore the random effect model is better able than the pooled OLS model to deal with
unobserved heterogeneity.
Considering Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation
After the model selection process has been completed, any attempt to interpret
variable coefficients or significance without first considering potential heteroskedasticity and/or
autocorrelation would be premature. Heteroskedasticity occurs when the error term has non81

constant variance while autocorrelation is when the error term in one time period is correlated
with the error term in another time period (Hilmer & Hilmer, 2014). Heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation both lead to situations where the parameter estimates of the model are
unbiased but are not minimum variance among all unbiased estimators (Hilmer & Hilmer, 2014).
Another consequence of heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation is that the calculated
standard errors are incorrect. As a result, all measures of precision (t-stats, p-values, confidence
intervals, and F-tests) based on those standard errors are also incorrect. The hypotheses of this
research hinge on the ability to reliably test and interpret the significance of the modeled
variables. Therefore, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation must be tested for, and if present,
corrected.
The Breusch-Pagan Test (1979) is used to test for heteroskedasticity and the Breusch–
Godfrey Test (Breusch, 1978; Godfrey, 1978) for panel models tests for autocorrelation. The
Breusch-Pagan Test and the Breusch–Godfrey Test were both conducted at the 0.05 level of
significance. The Breusch-Pagan Test did indicate the presence of heteroskedasticity, while the
Breusch–Godfrey Test did not indicate the presence of autocorrelation. Given these results,
White’s Heteroskedastic Consistent Standard Errors (White, 1980) are used to re-estimate
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors for the random effects model. The original and
heteroskedasticity consistent coefficient estimates and p-values are shown in Figure 14.
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Original coefficient estimates:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
0.0499127 0.0121620
4.1040 5.88e-05
PctDefenseSales 0.0285256 0.0190331
1.4987 0.135497
InfluenceXDef
-2.1369637 0.7446292 -2.8698 0.004542
RiskXDef
0.0075418 0.0865045
0.0872 0.930611
Influence
1.2547273 0.5033704
2.4927 0.013479
Risk
-0.0784291 0.0500789 -1.5661 0.118880
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1

***
**
*
‘ ’ 1

-------------------------------------------------------------Heteroskedasticity consistent coefficient estimates:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
0.0499127 0.0100715
4.9558 1.516e-06 ***
PctDefenseSales 0.0285256 0.0132330
2.1556
0.03229 *
InfluenceXDef
-2.1369637 1.2023057 -1.7774
0.07700 .
RiskXDef
0.0075418 0.0915493
0.0824
0.93443
Influence
1.2547273 0.7731014
1.6230
0.10615
Risk
-0.0784291 0.0444814 -1.7632
0.07937 .
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Figure 14: Original and Heteroskedasticity Consistent Coefficient Estimates for the Random Effects Model

Random Effects Panel Model Regression Results
The final model is still defined by Equation 4 below, with random effects being
determined as correctly specified and thusly providing estimates that are consistent and
efficient.
ROA it = β 0 + 1 (Influence it * % Defense Sales it ) + β 2 (Risk it * % Defense Sales it )

(4)

+ β 3 % Defense Sales it + β 4 Influence it + β 5 Risk it + U it

The heteroskedasticity consistent coefficient estimates for the random effects model shown in
Figure 14 now allow for accurate interpretation of the variable coefficients. The results indicate
that only one variable in the model -- % Defense Sales -- is significantly related to a defense
contractor’s profitability (as measured by Return on Assets) at the 0.05 level of significance.
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The coefficient and statistical significance of the interaction term “Influence × %
Defense Sales” in the final model guides the interpretation of hypothesis H1, defined as follows:
H1:

Ceteris paribus, profits earned by defense contractors from defense sales is
positively related to their level of influence in the defense contracting market.
The interaction term “Influence × % Defense Sales” is not statistically significant at the

0.05 level. The interaction term’s p-value of 0.077 is somewhat close to the chosen level of
significance though, which might suggest the possibility for some evidence that a defense
contractor’s influence relative to their level of total sales attributable to defense could relate to
their profitability. However, considering the coefficient estimate’s sign (-2.137) is opposite of
that predicted by hypothesis H1, the matter appears rather definitively settled. Hypothesis H1 is
rejected at the 0.05 level of significance and we conclude that there is no statistical evidence in
the random effects model that the profits of contractors for their defense sales are positively
related to their level of influence in the defense contracting market.
The second coefficient of interest is that of the interaction term “Risk × % Defense
Sales” and relates to hypothesis H2 which is defined as follows:
H2:

Ceteris paribus, profits earned by defense contractors from defense sales is
positively related to their risks from engaging in defense business.
The p-value of this interaction term is 0.934, which provides considerable support for

the conclusion related to this hypothesis. That is, that at the 0.05 level of significance we reject
hypothesis H2 and conclude there is no statistically significant evidence that profits earned by
defense contractors from defense sales is positively related to their risks assumed from
engaging in defense business.
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The firm’s percentage of defense sales to total sales was the only statistically significant
variable in the model at the 0.05 level. This coefficient estimate is related to hypothesis H3,
defined as follows:
H3:

Ceteris paribus, the profitability of defense contractors is not significantly related
to their percentage of total sales attributable to defense.
Because the two interaction terms previously discussed were found to be insignificant in

the model, the coefficient estimate for the % Defense Sales variable is interpreted as a maineffect: for every 1% increase in a defense contractor’s percentage of total sales attributable to
defense, a 0.0285% increase in their Return on Assets is predicted. This indicates that H3 should
be rejected, and we conclude at the 0.05 level of significance that defense contractor profit is
significantly related (positively) to their percentage of total sales attributable to defense. Put
another way, the higher percentage of total sales from defense sales is related to higher Returns
on Assets suggesting that, for the firms studied, defense sales may generally be more profitable
than commercial sales.
The final model output with heteroskedasticity consistent coefficient estimates reported
and condensed hypotheses test conclusions is summarized in Table 2
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Table 3: Summary of Final Model

Final Model, Random Effects:
ROA it = β 0 + β 1 (Influence it * % Defense Sales it ) + β 2 (Risk it * % Defense Sales it )
+ β 3 % Defense Sales it + β 4 Influence it + β 5 Risk it + U it
Unbalanced Panel: n = 27, T = 2-10, N = 209
Effects:
var
std.dev share
idiosyncratic 0.0012203 0.0349322 0.779
individual
0.0003472 0.0186325 0.221
theta:
Min.
0.2017

Total Sum of Squares:
Total Sum of Squares:
Residual Sum of Squares:
R-Squared:
Adj. R-Squared:
Chisq:
p-value:

1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.4475 0.4900 0.4560 0.4900 0.4900

0.27138
0.27138
0.24638
0.092131
0.06977
20.6002 on 5 DF
0.00096374

Residuals:
Min.
1st Qu. Median
Mean
3rd Qu.
Max.
-0.274266 -0.012646 0.004671 -0.000016 0.016185 0.116736
Dependent Variable:
Independent Variables
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡

Relationship
Predicted

Relationship
as Estimated

Coefficient

𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
t-stat

p-value

0.0499127

4.9558

1.516E-06

+

-

-2.1369637

-1.7774

0.07700

+

+

0.0075418

0.0824

0.93443

% 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

?

+

0.0285256

2.1556

0.03229

?

+

1.2547273

1.6230

0.10615

𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

?

-

-0.0784291

-1.7632

0.07937

𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 × % 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 × % 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

* Significant at the 0.05 level
Coefficient of Interest

Hypothesis Tested & Conclusion

β1

Hypothesis H1 explores the effects of “influence” on the correlation between a
defense contractor’s profitability and its percentage of defense sales to total
sales. This interaction term is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level,
consequently Hypothesis H1 is rejected.

β2

Hypothesis H2 explores the effects of “risk” on the correlation between a defense
contractor’s profitability and its percentage of defense sales to total sales. This
interaction term is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level, consequently
Hypothesis H2 is rejected.

β3

Hypothesis H3 explores how the percentage of total sales from defense relates to
profitability of the firm. The sign and significance of β 3 indicate a higher
percentage of total sales from defense is related to a higher ROA for the firm
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*

V. Conclusion
Chapter Overview
This chapter concludes this research effort. First, the findings of the research are
summarized. Next, a discussion regarding the limitations impacting the research is provided.
Finally, the chapter concludes by addressing potential areas of future research related to
defense contractor profitability.
Research Findings
The survey of literature provided in Chapter 2 inspired three questions explored by this
research. Due to the spatial-temporal nature of the data set, panel data analysis was the
method employed to investigate the research questions. First, three panel data estimators-pooled OLS, fixed effects, and random effects--were each examined to determine which one
provided the most efficient and consistent estimates when modeling the unbalanced data set of
209 firm-year observations from 27 defense contractors across 10 years. Although a twoway
fixed effects model was initially proposed based on the theory that both significant individual
fixed effects and time fixed effects were present, the model selection analysis demonstrated
that a random effects panel model was a more appropriate model for the data. The implication
of this specification is that individual firm effects are not correlated with any of the regressors in
the model. Therefore, individual specific heterogeneity is controlled for in the random effects
model as a component of the composite error term. This results in the intercept and slopes of
regressors remaining constant across firms, with the differences between firms stemming from
their individual specific error variances. With the model specification settled, the research
questions were then evaluated.
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The first research question considered the effect of a contractor’s influence in the
defense marketplace on the correlation between their profitability and their percentage of total
sales from defense. Here, “influence” was hypothesized as a moderating variable affecting the
direction and strength of the relationship between profitability and a firm’s percentage of total
sales from defense. Since there is no direct measure of contractor’s influence in the defense
marketplace, a proxy was used. This proxy was measured as the percent of total DoD prime
contract award dollars received by a firm in a given year. The hypothesis was explored by
including the interaction term “Influence x % Defense Sales” in the model and then assessing the
potential role of “influence” as a moderating variable by evaluating the significance and
parameter estimate of the interaction term. Ultimately, the interaction term was not found to
be statistically significant at the 0.05 level, indicating influence did not have a moderating effect
on the correlation between defense contractor profitability and their percentage of total sales
from defense.
The second research question considered the effect of risk on the correlation between a
defense contractor’s profitability and its percentage of total sales from defense work. Similar to
influence, “risk” was hypothesized as a moderating variable affecting the direction and strength
of the relationship between profitability and a firm’s percentage of total sales from defense.
Risk was proxied as the net property, plant, equipment, and intangible assets scaled by total
sales for the firm in a given year. The interaction term “Risk x % Defense Sales” was included in
the models to assess risk as a potential moderating variable. To this end, the significance and
parameter estimate of the interaction term were evaluated. Ultimately, the interaction term
was not found to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level, indicating risk did not have a
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moderating effect on the correlation between defense contractor profitability and their
percentage of total sales from defense.
Finally, this research examined if a significant relationship existed between a defense
contractor’s percentage of total sales attributable to defense work (versus commercial) and
their profitability; and if so, what the sign of that relationship was. The final random effects
model indicated that at the 0.05 level of significance, defense contractor profit was positively
related to their percentage of total sales attributable to defense. Plainly stated, the statistical
evidence suggested that higher percentages of defense sales related to higher Returns on Assets
-- implying that for the firms studied, defense sales were generally more profitable than
commercial sales.
Limitations
The primary limitation of the analytical findings presented herein is the generalizability
to U.S. defense contractors at large. The population of all U.S. defense contractors is extensive
and heterogeneous. This study is based off only 27 of those contractors and 209 unique firmyear observations spanning a 10-year period. Access limitations to the powerful databases and
data integrators commonly used by finance industry professionals--such a Bloomberg terminals-necessitated a sample selection technique primarily reliant instead on the publicly available
“Top 100 Contractors Report” produced by the U.S. General Services Administration and
provided by the Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation. This sample selection
technique likely reduced the population heterogeneity captured in the sample by focusing only
on those prominent contractors with which the U.S. government was most closely associated
financially. This reduction in sample heterogeneity very likely impacted the research findings
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and thus would significantly limit the generalizability of those findings to the larger population
of all U.S. defense contractors.
Also, the dynamic nature of the defense contracting environment limits the application
of these current findings to either previous or future time periods. Market conditions and
defense procurement regulations evolve along with the technologies and products the defense
industrial base produces and the levels of demand they satisfy. All these factors may be
significant determinants impacting defense profits which may differ considerably between any
two time periods.
Future Research
There are several possibilities to expand on this research along related lines. One area of
suggested exploration would be to study differences in defense contractor profit at the contract
level. This may allow for a greater understanding of the interaction of profit as an incentive and
contract performance across different contractors. This understanding could potentially be used
to improve either the defense contracting process or contract performance outcomes, or both.
Additionally, in reviewing literature for this research it was noted that a few previous
scholars had attempted to quantify and study the idea of “excessive” defense contractor profit.
None of the research reviewed however explicitly considered the differences between
accounting and economic profits. Economic profits may offer a logical and standardized way to
quantify excessive profits. In this vein, considering the difference between return on invested
capital (ROIC) and the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) may be particularly productive.
When ROIC is greater than WACC a company is generating returns from the capital it invests
that exceed the minimum required returns of the firm’s capital providers, capturing economic
profits.
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Furthermore, the empirical evidence from this research suggested that defense sales
were more profitable than commercial sales for the contractors sampled. An exploration into
whether this finding holds in either broader samples or across time may prove particularly
interesting and enlightening.
Finally, any research similar to that presented herein would benefit greatly from access
to the more robust databases and data integrators commonly used by finance industry
professions and other researchers. Such databases and data services include: Bloomberg
terminals, Compustat, Morningstar Direct, The Value Line Investment Survey, and The Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) datasets among others.
Summary
This chapter concludes this research effort, which strove to provide two primary
contributions to the field of defense contractor profit research: 1) a thorough survey of previous
defense contractor research; and 2) an updated analysis of defense contractor profitability. The
chapter began by summarizing the analytical research findings and then discussed the
limitations of the research. Finally, suggestions for related future research were provided.
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Appendix
Table 4: Summary of Defense Profit Studies and Findings
AUTHOR

DATE

TAXONOMY

PERIOD OF EXAMINATION

Weidenbaum

1968

Firm

1952-1955 & 1962-1965

Agapos & Gallaway

1970

Firm

1942-1967

Stigler & Friedland

1971

Firm

1948-1961 & 1958-1968

Bohi
Bicksler & Hess

1973
1976

Firm
Firm

1960-1969
1958-1968

Pownall

1986

Firm

1968-1970

Mayer-Sommer & Bedingfield

1989

Firm

1968-1977

Trevino & Higgs

1992

Firm

1970-1989

Lichtenberg

1992

Firm

1983-1989

Bowlin

1995

Firm

1978-1992

Zhong & Gribbin

2009

Firm

1984-1998

Wang & San Miguel

2012

Firm

1950-2010

Greer & Liao

1986

Segment

1963-1982

Rogerson

1992

Segment

N/A, Theoretical Equation

Thomas & Tung

1992

Segment

1975-1983

Bowlin

1999

Segment

1983-1992

McGowan & Vendrzyk

2002

Segment

1984-1989 & 1994-1998
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FINDINGS REGARDING DEFENSE BUSINESS
Defense firms more profitable than commercial firms, more
so in second period
No evidence of excessive (aerospace) profits relative to
positive demand shifts; net zero affect on profits from
Renegotiation Act
Defense Stockholder returns almost double the market
during 1950s, approximately the same (but less) during the
1960's
Defense and commercial profit performance not statistically
different
No price/yield disequilibrium returns to Defense stocks
Defense shareholders lost wealth prior to CASB, losses offset
by post-CASB gains
No significant difference in market or accounting returns
between defense and commercial business
Defense outperforms market by huge margin over whole
period; returns similar to market in 1970s and substantially
better during 1980s
Defense substantially more profitable than commercial
business
Financial condition of defense firms significantly worse than
commercial firms
Defense business is less profitable than commercial business
Defense business excessively profitable relative to
commercial; defense increasingly profitable after 1992
Defense business is less profitable than commercial business
Firms incentivized to allocate costs on defense contracts to
potentially increase profits
Pension cost shifting could potentially decrease commercial
business expenses
Defense more profitable 1983-1987; defense less profitable
1988-1889; defense more profiable again 1990-1992
Defense segments abnormally profitable 1984-1989; not
significantly different between 1994-1998

Stigler & Friedland

Weidenbaum

Agapos & Gallaway

Weidenbaum

Bohi
Bicksler & Hess

Stigler & Friedland

Pownall
Mayer-Sommer & Bedingfield

Greer & Liao

Trevino & Higgs
Wang & San Miguel

Thomas & Tung

Lichtenberg

Bowlin ('99)

McGowan & Vendrzyk

Bowlin (1999)

Bowlin (1995)

Bowlin (1999)

Zhong & Gribbon

McGowan & Vendrzyk

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
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|
|
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DEEFENSE BUSINESS
MORE PFORITABLE
MIXED OR NEUTRAL
PROFIT FINDINGS, OR
PROFIT NOT STUDIED
DEFENSE BUSINESS LESS
PROFITABLE

Figure 15: Defense Contractor Profit Study Periods and Findings

Time Period of Data Used in Defense Contractor Profit Studies
(non government research)
10
8
6
4
2
0

N/A

1940s

1950s

Firm Level Studies

1960s

1970s

1980s

Segment Level Studies

1990s

2000s

Total Studies

Figure 16: Time Period of Data Used in Defense Contractor Profit Studies
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2010present

Figure 17: Non-Government Research Taxonomy, Conclusions, and Time Period of Data
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix of Variables

Year
0.0151

1.0000

0.0451

1.0000

0.1975

1.0000

-0.0244

1.0000

-0.0496

1.0000

0.1470

1.0000

Influence
×
% Defense
Sales

ROA
-0.0404

-0.0978

-0.0630

0.9397

0.7858

Risk

% Defense Sales
-0.0383

-0.2377

0.3641

0.0667

Influence

Influence
0.1674

-0.1401

0.4104

% Defense Sales

Risk
-0.0606

-0.1993

ROA

Influence × % Defense Sales

0.1183

Year

Risk × % Defense Sales

Risk
×
% Defense
Sales

1.0000
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Table 6: Firm-Year Observations in Data Set by SIC Code & Firm

SIC Description (Code) & Associated Firms (Stock Ticker)

Firm-Year Observations

AIRCRAFT (3721)
THE BOEING COMPANY (BA)

10
10

AIRCRAFT AND PARTS (3720)
AAR CORP (AIR)
TEXTRON INC (TXT)

18
8
10

AIRCRAFT ENGINES AND ENGINE PARTS (3724)
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC (HON)
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP (UTX)

20
10
10

GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES AND PARTS (3760)
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP (LMT)

10
10

HEAVY CONSTRUCTION OTHER THAN BUILDING CONST CONTRACTORS (1600)
FLUOR CORP (FLR)
GREAT LAKES DREDGE AND DOCK CORP (GLDD)
JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP INC (JEC)
KBR INC (KBR)

36
10
7
10
9

HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL SERVICE PLANS (6324)
HUMANA INC (HUM)

10
10

MEASURING AND CONTROLLING DEVICES, NEC (3829)
CUBIC CORP (CUB)

8
8

MOTOR VEHICLES AND PASSENGER CAR BODIES (3711)
OSHKOSH CORP (OSK)

10
10

RADIO AND TV BROADCASTING AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT (3663)
VIASAT INC (VSAT)

2
2

RETAIL CATALOG AND MAIL ORDER HOUSES (5961)
CDW CORP (CDW)

4
4

SEARCH, DETECTION, NAVIGATION, GUIDANCE, AERONAUTICAL SYS (3812)
L3 TECHNOLOGIES INC (LHX)
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP (NOC)
RAYTHEON COMPANY (RTN)

22
2
10
10

SERVICES COMPUTER INTEGRATED SYSTEMS DESIGN (7373)
CACI INTERNATIONAL INC (CACI)
LEIDOS HOLDINGS INC (LDOS)
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP (SAIC)

19
10
4
5

SERVICES ENGINEERING SERVICES (8711)
AECOM (ACM)
VSE CORP (VSEC)

9
5
4

SERVICES FACILITIES SUPPORT MANAGEMENT SERVICES (8744)
VECTRUS INC (VEC)

4
4

SERVICES MANAGEMENT SERVICES (8741)
MANTECH INTERNATIONAL CORP (MANT)

9
9

SHIP AND BOAT BUILDING AND REPAIRING (3730)
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP (GD)
HUNTINGTON INGALLS INDUSTRIES INC (HII)

18
10
8

Grand Total

209
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Table 7: Average ROA, % Defense Sales, Influence, & Risk by SIC and Firm Name
SIC Description (Code) and Firm (Stock Ticker)
SERVICES FACILITIES SUPPORT MANAGEMENT SERVICES (8744)
VECTRUS INC (VEC)

Average
ROA

Average
% Defense Sales

Average
Influence

Average
Risk

7.41%

99.09%

0.30%

0.0068

7.41%

99.09%

0.30%

0.0068

7.39%

79.12%

3.68%

0.1453

L3 TECHNOLOGIES INC (LHX)

6.26%

74.50%

1.51%

0.3031

NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP (NOC)

7.42%

86.91%

3.53%

0.1513

RAYTHEON COMPANY (RTN)

7.59%

72.26%

4.27%

0.1077

SEARCH, DETECTION, NAVIGATION, GUIDANCE, AERONAUTICAL SYS (3812)

AIRCRAFT ENGINES AND ENGINE PARTS (3724)

6.94%

11.51%

1.16%

0.2935

HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC (HON)

7.45%

10.28%

0.40%

0.2251

UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP (UTX)

6.43%

12.74%

1.91%

0.3619

SHIP AND BOAT BUILDING AND REPAIRING (3730)

6.65%

79.23%

3.09%

0.2744

GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP (GD)

6.98%

64.11%

4.28%

0.1498

HUNTINGTON INGALLS INDUSTRIES INC (HII)

6.25%

98.13%

1.61%

0.4303

6.65%

11.69%

0.14%

0.0796

6.65%

11.69%

0.14%

0.0796

6.23%

75.60%

1.13%

0.0338

6.23%

75.60%

1.13%

0.0338

RETAIL CATALOG AND MAIL ORDER HOUSES (5961)
CDW CORP (CDW)
HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL SERVICE PLANS (6324)
HUMANA INC (HUM)
SERVICES COMPUTER INTEGRATED SYSTEMS DESIGN (7373)

5.90%

92.59%

0.55%

0.0837

CACI INTERNATIONAL INC (CACI)

5.19%

94.32%

0.51%

0.0651

LEIDOS HOLDINGS INC (LDOS)

5.22%

82.25%

0.60%

0.1817

SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP (SAIC)

7.86%

97.40%

0.58%

0.0423

5.55%

33.90%

6.45%

0.1636

5.55%

33.90%

6.45%

0.1636

5.36%

51.50%

0.13%

0.0894

5.36%

51.50%

0.13%

0.0894

SERVICES MANAGEMENT SERVICES (8741)

5.23%

98.94%

0.31%

0.0911

MANTECH INTERNATIONAL CORP (MANT)

5.23%

98.94%

0.31%

0.0911

4.18%

36.10%

0.82%

0.1595

4.18%

36.10%

0.82%

0.1595

AIRCRAFT (3721)
THE BOEING COMPANY (BA)
MEASURING AND CONTROLLING DEVICES, NEC (3829)
CUBIC CORP (CUB)

MOTOR VEHICLES AND PASSENGER CAR BODIES (3711)
OSHKOSH CORP (OSK)
HEAVY CONSTRUCTION OTHER THAN BUILDING CONST CONTRACTORS (1600)

3.98%

29.44%

0.35%

0.1466

FLUOR CORP (FLR)

5.42%

12.90%

0.45%

0.0466

GREAT LAKES DREDGE AND DOCK CORP (GLDD)

-0.92%

64.00%

0.15%

0.5245

JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP INC (JEC)

4.70%

23.50%

0.25%

0.0532

KBR INC (KBR)

5.38%

27.56%

0.49%

0.0677

SERVICES ENGINEERING SERVICES (8711)

3.85%

46.70%

0.26%

0.0997

AECOM (ACM)

1.34%

22.00%

0.34%

0.0589

VSE CORP (VSEC)

6.98%

77.58%

0.15%

0.1507

AIRCRAFT AND PARTS (3720)

3.21%

30.78%

0.38%

0.2065

AAR CORP (AIR)

2.69%

34.46%

0.12%

0.2115

TEXTRON INC (TXT)

3.62%

27.84%

0.59%

0.2025

GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES AND PARTS (3760)
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP (LMT)
RADIO AND TV BROADCASTING AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT (3663)
VIASAT INC (VSAT)
Grand Total

98

-0.46%

78.78%

10.45%

0.1407

-0.46%

78.78%

10.45%

0.1407

-0.53%

45.64%

0.14%

1.1258

-0.53%

45.64%

0.14%

1.1258

5.11%

53.93%

1.85%

0.1655

Figure 18: Average % Defense Sales by Firm
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Average % Defense Sales & ROA By Firm
VECTRUS INC (VEC)
MANTECH INTERNATIONAL CORP (MANT)
HUNTINGTON INGALLS INDUSTRIES INC (HII)
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP (SAIC)
CACI INTERNATIONAL INC (CACI)
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP (NOC)
LEIDOS HOLDINGS INC (LDOS)
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP (LMT)
VSE CORP (VSEC)
HUMANA INC (HUM)
L3 TECHNOLOGIES INC (LHX)
RAYTHEON COMPANY (RTN)
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP (GD)
GREAT LAKES DREDGE AND DOCK CORP (GLDD)
CUBIC CORP (CUB)
VIASAT INC (VSAT)
OSHKOSH CORP (OSK)
AAR CORP (AIR)
THE BOEING COMPANY (BA)
TEXTRON INC (TXT)
KBR INC (KBR)
JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP INC (JEC)
AECOM (ACM)
FLUOR CORP (FLR)
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP (UTX)
CDW CORP (CDW)
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC (HON)

99.09%

7.41%

98.94%

5.23%

98.13%

6.25%

97.40%

7.86%

94.32%

5.19%

86.91%

7.42%

82.25%

5.22%

78.78%

-0.46%

77.58%

6.98%

75.60%

6.23%

74.50%

6.26%

72.26%

7.59%

64.11%

6.98%

64.00%

-0.92%

51.50%

5.36%

45.64%

-0.53%

36.10%

4.18%

34.46%

2.69%
5.55%
3.62%
5.38%
4.70%
1.34%

33.90%
27.84%
27.56%
23.50%
22.00%

12.90%
5.42%
12.74%
6.43%
11.69%
6.65%
10.28%
7.45%

-0.01 0.09 0.19 0.29 0.39 0.49 0.59 0.69 0.79 0.89 0.99
Average of PctDefenseSales

Average of ROA

Figure 19: Average % Defense Sales & ROA by Firm
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Table 8: Percent of Total DoD Prime Contract Award Dollars Received by Each Firm in Each Year
Firm Name (Stock Ticker)
AAR CORP (AIR)
AECOM (ACM)
CACI INTERNATIONAL INC (CACI)
CDW CORP (CDW)
CUBIC CORP (CUB)
FLUOR CORP (FLR)
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP (GD)
GREAT LAKES DREDGE AND DOCK CORP (GLDD)
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC (HON)
HUMANA INC (HUM)
HUNTINGTON INGALLS INDUSTRIES INC (HII)
JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP INC (JEC)
KBR INC (KBR)
L3 TECHNOLOGIES INC (LHX)
LEIDOS HOLDINGS INC (LDOS)
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP (LMT)
MANTECH INTERNATIONAL CORP (MANT)
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP (NOC)
OSHKOSH CORP (OSK)
RAYTHEON COMPANY (RTN)
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP (SAIC)
TEXTRON INC (TXT)
THE BOEING COMPANY (BA)
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP (UTX)
VECTRUS INC (VEC)
VIASAT INC (VSAT)
VSE CORP (VSEC)
Grand Total

2009

0.66%

2010
0.13%

0.12%
0.74%
5.04%

0.61%

2011
0.13%

0.13%
0.52%
3.81%

0.54%

2012
0.12%

2013
0.15%
0.13%
0.50%

2014
0.11%

8.83%
0.26%
3.25%
0.19%
4.16%
0.23%
0.56%
6.34%
2.15%

38.51%

0.56%
10.77%
0.22%
3.48%
0.52%
4.53%
0.70%
0.58%
5.35%
2.45%
0.27%

0.14%
0.29%
4.32%
0.18%
0.41%
1.30%
1.13%
0.26%
0.21%

35.38%

0.52%
0.11%
0.14%
0.32%
4.80%
0.13%
0.33%
1.24%
1.42%
0.29%

2015
0.12%
0.23%
0.46%

% of Total DoD Prime Contract Award Dollars Received

0.15%
0.51%
4.04%

0.14%
0.70%
3.94%
0.19%
0.40%
1.14%
1.85%
0.25%
0.14%

12.19%
0.41%
3.01%
0.57%
4.31%

0.45%

0.39%
0.90%

0.39%
0.97%
2.05%
0.27%
0.14%

8.38%
0.49%
2.69%
0.43%
3.98%

0.13%
0.20%
4.33%
0.11%
0.47%
0.95%

0.44%
0.93%
0.87%
0.28%
0.61%

9.64%
0.46%
3.74%
1.34%
3.77%

0.29%
0.99%

8.07%
0.41%
4.33%
2.01%
4.03%

0.25%
1.28%

8.66%
0.18%
5.05%
1.76%
4.23%

0.89%
6.38%
1.80%

39.08%

0.66%
7.79%
2.22%

35.59%

0.68%
5.46%
1.96%

36.81%

0.61%
5.01%
1.89%

0.14%
34.57%

0.35%
5.69%
1.95%

0.21%
36.25%

* Top 24% of Values for Each Year are Highlighted

2016
0.43%
0.47%
0.15%
0.12%
0.25%
4.27%
0.09%
0.33%
1.21%
1.49%
0.20%
0.16%
0.55%
12.13%
0.20%
3.61%
0.48%
4.28%
0.73%
0.65%
8.17%
2.19%
0.33%
0.13%
0.15%
42.76%

2017
0.08%
0.45%
0.48%
0.17%

0.77%
3.95%
0.21%
0.51%
1.50%
1.96%
0.27%
0.46%
1.48%
0.51%
10.77%

2018
0.10%
0.48%
0.42%
0.11%

42.70%

2.99%
0.44%
5.02%
0.52%
0.46%
7.61%
1.71%
0.32%
0.14%

0.23%
4.27%
0.13%
0.36%
1.14%
2.10%
0.13%
0.38%
1.53%
0.77%
15.01%
0.15%
3.11%
0.47%
4.35%
0.74%
0.46%
6.65%
0.82%
0.31%

0.12%
44.38%
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and the percentage of total sales attributed to defense (versus commercial sales) is investigated. Neither contractor
influence, nor risk was found to have a moderating effect on defense business profits. The empirical evidence did
however indicate a positive relationship between contractor profitability and the percentage of total sales from
defense business.
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